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I. Introduction 
Legal scholarship commonly expresses that attorneys must 
provide zealous advocacy and diligent representation to their 
clients.1 What happens, however, when an attorney’s client owes 
a similar duty to give priority to and protect the interests of third 
parties?2 In cases in which an attorney represents a fiduciary, the 
attorney must consider what duties, if any, he owes to third-party 
beneficiaries.3 The issue of what “special obligations” an attorney 
                                                                                                     
 1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2012) (“A lawyer 
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”). 
 2. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in 
Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 890 (1994) (questioning the 
duties owed amongst parties “when the lawyer is not the only fiduciary in the 
attorney–client relationship”). 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 11 (“Where the client 
is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings 
with a beneficiary.”); ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Report 
of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility: Counseling the 
Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 825, 827 (1994) (noting that often an 
attorney “must consider what duties, if any, he or she may owe to beneficiaries 
and others”); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 889 (“Although the attorney’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to the client is well established in the law, a gap exists when that 
client is a fiduciary of a third party.”). 
BLURRED LINES 2611 
may owe beneficiaries arises most commonly when an attorney 
represents a trustee or personal representative of an estate, 
which is the focus of this Note.4  
It is imperative that an attorney hired to represent a trustee 
or estate representative understand whom he represents and to 
whom he owes duties.5 This is often unclear because of the 
various individuals involved in handling trust and estate 
matters, each having distinct interests.6 Fiduciaries’ attorneys 
should beware of the potential liability that exists if they fail to 
exercise care and loyalty towards beneficiaries’ interests.7  
Current authorities acknowledge that confusion riddles this 
subject.8 The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility comment 
that “in estate administration the identity of the client may be 
unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction.”9 Rules of 
professional responsibility and existing case law can be 
contradictory.10 In describing the relationship between an 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the 
Attorney Owe Duties?, 37 ACTEC L.J. 469, 469 (2011) (explaining that these 
issues, arising in the context of “a trustee or personal representative, are likely 
the most common”).  
 5. See Todd A. Fuller, Attorney Liability to Estate Beneficiaries: The 
Privity Passes Through, 100 DICK. L. REV. 29, 29 (1995) (noting that the issue is 
complex because “traditional notions of liability do not easily apply to the 
relationship between an estate attorney and beneficiaries of the estate”). 
 6. See Eric. D. Correira, Establishing and Protecting the Attorney–Client 
Relationship in Trust Matters, 61 R.I. BAR J. 9, 9 (2012) (“Many times, the lines 
of client representation are blurred because the various individuals/entities 
involved, each with distinct legal interests, appear (at least for the moment) to 
be coexisting in harmony.”). 
 7. See Robert S. Held, A Trust Counsel’s Duty to Beneficiaries, 92 ILL. B.J. 
636, 636 (2004) (emphasizing that a fiduciary’s attorney “should beware the 
potential for liability if they fail to act with due care to protect beneficiaries’ 
interests”). 
 8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27 (2012) (“Under one 
view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or 
trust, including its beneficiaries.”); ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l 
Responsibility, supra note 3, at 828 (“[S]ome courts and commentators have 
suggested that the lawyer for the fiduciary may owe some derivative duties to 
the beneficiaries served by that fiduciary.”). 
 9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27. 
 10. See Correira, supra note 6, at 9 (“There is no set guidance for the trust 
attorney to follow, instead he or she must rely on the applicable Rules of 
Professional Responsibility and relevant case law, which, in a given 
circumstance, can be either vague or contradictory.”). 
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attorney and beneficiaries, courts and ethics committees 
sometimes create uncertainty over whether and to what extent 
an attorney owes any duty to beneficiaries.11 In jurisdictions 
recognizing that an attorney owes fiduciary duties to 
beneficiaries, it is not clear if the duties differ from those the 
attorney owes the client.12 When hiring an attorney, is the 
fiduciary also an agent contracting on behalf of the beneficiaries? 
Alternatively, are the fiduciary and beneficiaries joint-clients of 
the attorney? The current confusion surrounding this issue can 
result in an attorney’s misunderstanding of to whom he owes 
duties, which may create potential liability.13 
Legal authority in this setting is scant. The authority that 
exists tends to focus on fee disputes, evidentiary privileges, and 
malpractice issues raising the question of whether beneficiaries 
have the right to sue an attorney.14 This Note will focus on the 
latter issue of whether beneficiaries have the right to bring 
claims against the fiduciary’s attorney for breach of fiduciary 
duty or professional negligence. This Note analyzes the issue 
assuming that the attorney and fiduciary have not entered into 
an agreement regarding an attorney’s duties to beneficiaries.15 
Part II of this Note examines the scope of duties an attorney 
owes a client. It distinguishes an attorney’s duty of care and 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: 
Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319, 1325 (1994) (discussing how 
“ethics committees describe the relationship with the fiduciary, . . . the 
beneficiaries, and . . . the entity itself differs rather dramatically, generating 
uncertainty and confusion that prevents any real understanding of the 
attorney’s role . . . [where] the identity of the client is relevant”). 
 12. See id. at 1322 (explaining that, in cases determining an attorney owes 
fiduciary duties to beneficiaries, “it is not clear whether fiduciary duties to the 
fiduciary that run to the beneficiaries differ from fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries directly”); Held, supra note 7, at 636 (“The case law in this area is 
uneven and unsettled.”). 
 13. See Correira, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasizing that the 
misunderstanding surrounding this issue, “if acted upon, can result in potential 
liability”). 
 14. See Pennell, supra note 11, at 1321 (highlighting the typical issues the 
reported cases involve, such as “fee disputes, evidentiary privileges, and legal 
malpractice claims”). 
 15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (suggesting that an 
attorney may enter an agreement with all the parties to represent the fiduciary 
and the beneficiaries); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 891 (“The law must supply a 
default rule in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties.”).  
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fiduciary duties, and addresses the blurred distinctions between 
these duties. Part III of this Note explores state court decisions 
and other authorities determining that an attorney owes some 
duties to a fiduciary-client’s beneficiaries. Part IV introduces the 
traditional approach, under which courts have held that an 
attorney owes no duties to any beneficiary of the fiduciary-client. 
Part V highlights the advantages and disadvantages of both 
approaches. It explores the questions raised if an attorney owes 
duties to the fiduciary-client’s beneficiaries: What happens if the 
fiduciary and beneficiaries’ interests become adverse? If an 
attorney does not owe any special duty to beneficiaries, what 
protections exist for beneficiaries upon breach of the fiduciary-
client’s duties? Part VI recommends that the traditional approach 
is the best resolution to this issue. It explains that the traditional 
approach has greater advantages than the other approaches 
(discussed in Part IV) and addresses perceived disadvantages. 
Part VII concludes this Note and summarizes the 
recommendation and rationale supporting it. 
II. The Range of Duties and Liability Exposure 
Identifying what duties a trustee’s or estate representative’s 
attorney owes to beneficiaries can easily confuse the fiduciary 
duties that the fiduciary-client owes to beneficiaries with the 
professional duties an attorney owes to a client. A separate 
explanation of these duties and the range of liabilities a breach of 
these duties imposes gives context to the different approaches 
adopted by various jurisdictions.  
A. Attorney’s Liability Exposure to Fiduciary-Client 
The creation of an attorney–client relationship imputes the 
attorney with an extensive list of duties owed to the client by 
virtue of this professional relationship.16 Specifically, an attorney 
                                                                                                     
 16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3–1.4, 1.6 (2012) (explaining 
an attorney’s duty to act with diligence, to communicate with the client, and to 
keep the client’s confidences); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (listing duties an attorney owes the client “consistent with 
the lawyer’s other legal duties and subject to other provisions of [the] 
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has a duty to represent clients in a manner “reasonably 
calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives.”17 An attorney 
must also act with reasonable competence and diligence,18 
reasonably communicate with clients about the status of a 
matter, and fulfill reasonable requests for information.19 An 
attorney must fulfill any contractual obligations to the client as 
well.20 Differing methods exist to enforce these duties, such as 
disciplinary proceedings as well as client suits against the 
attorney for damages, restitution, injunction, or other judicial 
remedy.21 
1. Attorney’s Duty of Care and Professional Negligence 
In representing clients, attorneys owe a broad duty to 
exercise reasonable care in representing and pursuing the client’s 
lawful interests, which captures many of the duties listed above.22 
Under the duty of care concept, an attorney must exercise the 
competence and diligence normally exercised by attorneys in the 
same or similar circumstances.23 Attorneys owe a duty of care in 
pursuing the client’s objectives and in carrying out the fiduciary 
duties owed to the client.24 An attorney’s duty of care creates the 
                                                                                                     
Restatement”). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000). 
 18. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (2012) (stating 
that a lawyer shall “provide competent representation to a client” and shall also 
“act with reasonable diligence and promptness”). 
 19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2012) (“(a) A lawyer 
shall . . . (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
[and] (4) comply promptly with reasonable requests for information . . . .”). 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) 
(“[A] lawyer must . . . fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client.”). 
 21. See id. § 16 cmt. a (describing the various methods available to enforce 
the duties listed against attorneys); id. § 6 (listing judicial remedies available 
against an attorney in breach of a duty owed to a client or nonclient). 
 22. See id. § 50 (describing an attorney’s duty of care to the client); id. § 16 
cmt. d (using the duties of competence and diligence to describe an attorney’s 
broader duty of care). 
 23. See id. § 52 (defining the standard of care to which an attorney is held 
for purposes of liability). 
 24. See id. § 52 cmt. a (highlighting the way in which an attorney must 
carry out the duty of care). 
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potential liability for professional negligence.25 Thus, if an 
attorney fails to fulfill any of the duties listed above, there may 
be a breach of the duty of care, and the attorney may be subject to 
claims of professional negligence brought by the client.26 
An attorney is subject to liability for professional negligence 
if a party—client or nonclient—can prove that an attorney 
breached a duty of care owed to that party, and the breach caused 
the claimant injury.27 The cause of action for legal malpractice 
based on professional negligence discourages a lawyer’s improper 
conduct or inaction and compensates plaintiffs for injury caused 
by such negligence.28 If a plaintiff can prove that an attorney did 
not exercise the competence and diligence that a reasonable 
attorney under similar circumstances would have exercised, the 
plaintiff may recover compensatory damages.29 Courts may also 
grant other remedies such as rescission, injunctions, declaratory 
relief, or restitution.30  
2. Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duties to Clients 
An attorney is a fiduciary, which means the attorney is 
someone to whom another person entrusts with his affairs under 
circumstances that may make it difficult or unfavorable for that 
other person to closely oversee the attorney’s performance.31 The 
nature of this relationship provides a client with another cause of 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. § 48 (outlining the elements of professional negligence, 
beginning with attorney’s potential liability to those whom a duty of care is 
owed). 
 26. See id. (noting that an attorney is civilly liable “for professional 
negligence to a person to whom the lawyer owes a duty of care”). 
 27. See id. (explaining a negligence standard of professional misconduct 
requiring a duty of care, breached by the attorney, which is the legal cause of 
the claimant’s injury). A claim of professional negligence is a form of legal 
malpractice, and the terms are often used synonymously. See id. § 48 cmt. a 
(emphasizing the similar nature of the terms “professional negligence” and 
“legal malpractice”). 
 28. See id. § 48 cmt. b (discussing how professional negligence and 
malpractice applies to attorneys). 
 29. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s burden of proof). 
 30. See id. (noting courts’ powers to supply various remedies). 
 31. See id. § 16 cmt. b (explaining the attorney’s role as a fiduciary). 
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action to recover damages—a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.32 
Although specific definitions of fiduciary duties vary depending 
on the context,33 the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers explains that an attorney must “comply with obligations 
concerning the client’s confidences and property, avoid 
impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client, 
and not employ advantages arising from the client–lawyer 
relationship in a manner adverse to the client.”34 Under the 
Restatement, if an attorney breaches these duties causing injury 
to the client, the attorney is liable for breach of fiduciary duty.35 
Through a breach of fiduciary duty claim, clients may seek either 
damages or other remedies.36 
                                                                                                     
 32. See id. § 49 cmt. b (commenting that “[a] lawyer owes a client the 
fiduciary duties specified in § 16(3)”). 
 33. See 2 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 127–28 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (acknowledging the many 
contexts in which fiduciary relationships are created). Most American 
jurisdictions have included at least two fiduciary duties: the duty of undivided 
loyalty and the duty of confidence. 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:1 (2013). “The 
attorney is under a duty to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to 
preserve the client’s confidences and to disclose any material matters infringing 
upon these obligations.” Id. Fiduciary duties describe the trust, loyalty, and 
confidence that one party owes to another in many contexts. FRANKEL, supra, at 
127. Although specific definitions may vary, the significance of fiduciary duties 
in the various fiduciary relationships cannot be understated. Id. In an often-
cited and widely recognized partnership law case, Judge Benjamin Cardozo 
expresses this importance: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then 
the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been 
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule 
of undivided loyalty by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular 
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been 
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).  
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(3) (2000). 
 35. See id. § 49 (giving the elements for a breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action). 
 36. See id. § 49 cmt. d (emphasizing that an attorney who “has acted with 
reasonable care is not liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but other 
remedies such as disqualification, restitution, and injunctive or declaratory 
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3. Blurred Distinctions Between the Duty of Care and Fiduciary 
Duties 
An attorney’s professional duty of care and fiduciary duties 
often overlap. For example, an attorney may fail to exercise the 
competence and diligence ordinarily exercised by other attorneys 
in like circumstances—a breach of the duty of care—by failing to 
reasonably inform and communicate with the client—a breach of 
fiduciary duty.37 When an attorney’s competence and diligence 
are important to carrying out the fiduciary duty in question, the 
duty of care standard applies.38 Thus, one can reasonably classify 
many claims against an attorney as professional negligence 
(breach of the duty of care) or a breach of fiduciary duty.39 
Similarly, legal authorities often classify the duty of care as a 
fiduciary duty owed to clients.40 Therefore, claimants usually add 
a breach of fiduciary duty claim to a negligence claim for “rhetoric 
or completeness.”41 Classifying a claim as a breach of fiduciary 
duty may affect the applicable limitations period, depending on 
the language and policies of a jurisdiction’s statute of 
limitations.42 Regardless of whether a claim is styled as 
professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, the client may 
                                                                                                     
relief may be available”). 
 37. See id. § 20 (explaining an attorney’s duty to keep the client reasonably 
informed and to consult with the client); id. § 49 cmt. b (listing an attorney’s 
fiduciary duties to clients as including those duties addressed in § 20). 
 38. See id. § 49 cmt. d (“When the fiduciary duty in question is that of 
competence or diligence or of proceeding in a manner reasonably calculated to 
advance the client's lawful objectives, the standard of § 52(1) . . . controls.”); id. 
§ 52 (defining the standard of care for purposes of civil liability for professional 
negligence).  
 39. See id. § 49 cmt. c (explaining a variety of claims that are characterized 
as professional negligence or misconduct); id. § 49 cmt. d (noting that the 
standard of care used in a professional negligence action is sometimes used as 
the standard for a breach of fiduciary duty claim). 
 40. See id. (clarifying that “the duty of care enforced in a negligence action 
is also a fiduciary duty” under § 16(2)); see also id. § 16(2) (including in its 
description of duties owed to clients a duty to exercise the diligence and 
competence of a reasonable attorney in like circumstances). 
 41. Id. § 49 cmt. c. 
 42. See id. (offering a reason for why classifying a claim as a breach of 
fiduciary duty may make a difference to the outcome of the action). 
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be entitled to a damages award, which is ultimately what 
injured plaintiffs desire.43 
Separate from an attorney’s duties to a client are any duties 
a client may owe to third parties. When the client is a fiduciary, 
the client owes fiduciary duties wholly distinct from those 
fiduciary duties an attorney owes a client. Such duties are 
discussed below.  
B. Fiduciary-Client’s Liability Exposure to Beneficiaries 
Article 8 of the Uniform Trust Code outlines the duties a 
trustee owes to beneficiaries of the trust.44 A breach of trust 
occurs when a trustee fails to comply with any of these duties 
owed to beneficiaries.45 A breach of trust is synonymous with a 
breach of fiduciary duty because both arise upon a trustee’s 
failure to exercise duties owed to the trust beneficiaries.46 In 
fact, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts describes any duty a 
trustee owes, as trustee, to the beneficiaries as a trustee’s 
fiduciary duties.47 A breach of fiduciary duty may occur by a 
                                                                                                     
 43. See id. § 49 cmt. d (noting under what circumstances an attorney may 
be liable for damages to the client in a breach of fiduciary duty action); id. § 48 
cmt. a (explaining that plaintiffs in a professional negligence action may seek 
compensatory damages). 
 44. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE ART. 8 (2010) (outlining the general duties 
and powers of trustees). 
 45. See id. § 1001 (defining breach of trust and discussing remedies 
available for a breach of trust); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 93 (2002) (“A 
breach of trust is a failure by the trustee to comply with any duty that the 
trustee owes, as trustee, to the beneficiaries, or to further the charitable 
purpose, of the trust.”). 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 93 cmt. b (2002) (describing a 
breach of trust as a failure to exercise any of the trustee's fiduciary duties). This 
Note refers to a breach of trust as a breach of fiduciary duty because in cases 
where beneficiaries sue the trustee, the claim is usually styled as a breach of 
fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1263 (1990) 
(describing the legatee-plaintiff’s claims against the trustee (and his attorney) 
as, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty for acting imprudently in 
negotiating on behalf of the trust); Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 552 (1994) 
(explaining plaintiff-beneficiaries’ claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary 
duty). 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 93 cmt. b (2003) (explaining 
fiduciary duties to be any duty owed, as trustee, to beneficiaries or to further the 
charitable purposes). 
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trustee’s action, inaction, intentional conduct, or negligent 
conduct.48 
Perhaps the most important obligation of a trustee is the 
duty of loyalty.49 This duty prevents a trustee from putting the 
interests of others above the interests of the beneficiaries.50 The 
duty of loyalty also prevents a trustee from engaging in conduct 
that creates a conflict between the trustee’s personal and 
fiduciary interests.51 An extension of a trustee’s duty of loyalty is 
the duty of impartiality.52 The duty of impartiality requires a 
trustee, when representing multiple beneficiaries, to act 
impartially in investing, managing, and distributing trust 
property while keeping in mind the beneficiaries’ respective 
interests.53 Trustees also have a duty to administer the trust “in 
good faith” and in accordance with its terms, the beneficiaries’ 
interests, and applicable law.54 Additionally, a trustee has a duty 
to administer the trust as a prudent person would in light of the 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. (detailing the various situations in which a trustee may breach 
fiduciary duties). 
 49. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2010) (explaining the trustee’s 
duty of loyalty as “perhaps the most fundamental duty of the trustee”). 
 50. See id. (“A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of 
the beneficiaries.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (2003) (“[A] trustee 
has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, or 
solely in furtherance of its charitable purposes.”). 
 51. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 802(b)–(c) (2010) (establishing that certain 
trustee’s transactions are presumed to create a conflict of personal and fiduciary 
interests and any such transaction that creates a conflict of interests is voidable 
by affected beneficiaries); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (2003) (noting 
that the “trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that 
involve self-dealing or otherwise involve or create a conflict between the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests”). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b (2003) (describing the 
duty of impartiality as an “extension of the duty of loyalty to beneficiaries” but 
involving unavoidable and thus permissible conflicting duties to beneficiaries 
with their competing interests). 
 53. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 803 (2010) (“If a trust has two or more 
beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and 
distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries respective 
interests.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2003) (requiring a trustee to 
act impartially while managing a trust on behalf of multiple beneficiaries). 
 54. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 801; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 76(1)–(2) (2003) (listing the trustee’s responsibilities in administering the 
trust). 
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circumstances.55 This essentially applies the duty of care 
standard56 to a trustee in managing and administering the 
trust.57 This is another example of the common conflation of 
fiduciary duty and the duty of care.58 A trustee’s other duties 
include the duty to take control of the trust property,59 the duty of 
recordkeeping,60 the duty to enforce claims of the trust,61 and the 
duty to inform and report.62 Acting or failing to act in a manner 
that does not conform to these duties exposes a trustee to liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty (or breach of trust), which may be 
remedied by monetary damages.63 
                                                                                                     
 55. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 804 (2010) (explaining a trustee’s duty of 
prudence in administering the trust); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 77 (2003) (describing a trustee’s duty of prudence). 
 56. Supra Part II.A.1. 
 57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 cmt. b (2003) (explaining that 
the duty of prudence involves the duty to exercise reasonable care in managing 
and administering the trust). 
 58. See id. § 77 cmt. a (acknowledging that the duty of prudence requires 
the exercise of reasonable care while carrying out other fiduciary obligations). 
Therefore, a breach of the duty of prudence (or duty of care) can lead to a claim 
of breach of fiduciary duty. Id. 
 59. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 809 (2010) (“A trustee shall take reasonable 
steps to take control of and protect the trust property.”). 
 60. See id. § 810 (noting that, among other things, a trustee must “keep 
adequate records of the administration of the trust” and “keep trust property 
separate from the trustee’s own property”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 
(2003) (explaining a trustee’s duty to “maintain clear, complete, and accurate 
books and records regarding the trust property and the administration of the 
trust”).  
 61. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 811 (2010) (“A trustee shall take reasonable 
steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against the trust.”). 
 62. See id. § 813 (describing the situations in which a trustee must keep 
certain beneficiaries reasonably informed about the administration of the trust, 
and “[u]nless unreasonable under the circumstances,” must furnish certain 
information upon request to beneficiaries); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 
(2003) (explaining the “duty to furnish information to beneficiaries”).  
 63. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 1001 (2010) (explaining that when a trustee 
violates a duty owed to beneficiaries, a breach of trust occurs, and among other 
things, may be remedied by compelling the trustee to pay money or restore 
property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2003) (explaining that a 
trustee who commits a breach of fiduciary duty is chargeable with the amount 
required to restore the value to the trust or with the amount of any benefit 
derived by the trustee as a result of the breach). 
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III. One Approach: Attorney Owes Some Form of Duty to 
Fiduciary-Client’s Beneficiaries 
Determining what duty, if any, an attorney owes to the 
beneficiaries of a trust or estate necessitates an analysis of case 
decisions. Many of these cases have concluded that a fiduciary’s 
attorney does owe duties to beneficiaries.64 An attorney must 
grapple with these decisions before accepting representation of a 
trustee or estate representative to assess the range of possible 
liabilities to which the attorney may be exposed.65 
A. Imposition on Attorneys of Duties Owed to Clients’ Beneficiaries 
Some courts have imposed duties on a fiduciary’s attorney, 
which subjects the attorney to liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty, legal malpractice, or both. Attorneys for both trustees and 
estate representatives have frequently been subjected to such 
duties.66 
One example of a court levying on an attorney a duty of care 
to beneficiaries is American Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. 
Edwards & Angell, LLP.67 In American Kennel Club, the Superior 
Court of Rhode Island found that a trustee’s attorney owed a duty 
of care to the trust beneficiaries.68 In 1976, Camilla Lyman 
established and funded the Camilla Lyman Unitrust (Unitrust) to 
provide annual distributions to herself during her lifetime.69 She 
                                                                                                     
 64. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (listing cases from various 
jurisdictions that have determined a fiduciary’s attorney owes a duty to 
beneficiaries). 
 65. See Lee, supra note 4, at 469 (explaining that courts have not been 
uniform in opinions, offering little clarity or guidance on to whom the attorney 
owes duties when the client acts in a fiduciary capacity). 
 66. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (listing cases that have 
imposed duties on attorneys for trustees and estate representatives owed to 
beneficiaries).  
 67. See Am. Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. Edwards & Angell, LLP, 
No. Civ.A. PB 00-2683, 2002 WL 1803923, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2002) 
(concluding that the Dog Museum, as the “ultimate beneficiary of the Lyman 
trust,” had standing to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty and legal 
malpractice). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at *1. 
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named the Dog Museum of America as the sole remainder 
beneficiary of the Unitrust on her death.70 The defendants, 
Edwards & Angell, LLP, and James Barnett, Esq., facilitated the 
appointment of Robert A. Ragosta and George T. O’Neil as co-
trustees.71 
Several months after Lyman established the Unitrust, she 
disappeared.72 This case arose from Ragosta and O’Neil’s 
management of the trust after Lyman’s disappearance.73 Ragosta 
and O’Neil undertook several transactions to preserve Lyman’s 
assets, including the Unitrust, after her disappearance in case 
she returned.74 While conducting these transactions, many of 
which generated losses to the Unitrust, they consulted the 
defendants.75  
In 2000, the Dog Museum and Ragosta filed an action 
against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and legal 
malpractice.76 The defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment and advanced a number of arguments.77 Significantly, 
they argued that the court should adopt the rule followed in 
many jurisdictions that “the attorney of a trustee owes no duty of 
care to the beneficiaries.”78 The defendants contended that 
establishing a duty of care between the trustee’s attorney and the 
beneficiary exposes the attorney to possible or actual conflicts of 
                                                                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. Strangely, Lyman was discovered some ten years later in the septic 
system of her home. Id. 
 73. See id. at *4 (noting that the Dog Museum brought claims for breach of 
fiduciary duties and legal malpractice). 
 74. Id. Seeking to preserve Lyman’s assets, Ragosta and O’Neil defended a 
lawsuit against Massachusetts Trustees that eventually settled, transferred 
Lyman’s Hopkinton property into the Unitrust to generate income, used 
Unitrust assets to pay IRS deficiencies and liens, opposed an action by the 
Lyman family to have Lyman’s date of death declared as of July 20, 1987, and 
sold Lyman’s Hopkinton property with proceeds to go into the Unitrust. See id. 
(describing actions taken by Ragosta and O’Neil to preserve Lyman’s assets and 
the results of the transactions). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at *7 (listing the defendant’s arguments against owing duties to 
beneficiaries, including the existence of “inherent conflicts of interest that 
prohibit the recognition of a duty of care”). 
 78. Id. (citing Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 544–45 (Mass. 1994)). 
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interest.79 The defendants claimed that the co-trustees had an 
interest in continuing distributions from the Unitrust and using 
those distributions to maintain Lyman’s property despite her 
disappearance.80 The conflicting interest was that of the Dog 
Museum in ceasing distributions to Lyman to make distributions 
to it as the sole remainderman beneficiary of the Unitrust.81 
After considering and rejecting cases from other 
jurisdictions82 that determined “only the trustee, not the trust 
beneficiary, is the client of the attorney,”83 the Superior Court of 
Rhode Island determined that “a trustee’s attorney owes a duty of 
care to the trust beneficiaries.”84 Therefore, “the Dog Museum, as 
the ultimate beneficiary of the Lyman trust, ha[d] standing to 
bring suit against Defendants for legal malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty.”85 Importantly, the court acknowledged that the 
duty of care imposed on a trustee’s attorney gave standing to a 
trust beneficiary to claim breach of fiduciary duty even though 
the court did not explicitly impose the full spectrum of fiduciary 
duties on the trustee’s attorney.86 
The American Kennel Club court analyzed several cases in 
which courts have similarly imposed duties on a fiduciary’s 
attorney owed to beneficiaries. One such case was Charleson v. 
Hardesty,87 in which attorney James Hardesty had prepared a 
                                                                                                     
 79. See id. (explaining the defendants’ fear of creating conflicts of interest 
in trustees’ attorneys by establishing a duty of care owed by the attorneys to 
beneficiaries). The fear of exposing attorneys to potential or actual conflicts of 
interest is one of the primary arguments against imposing special duties to 
beneficiaries on a fiduciary’s attorney. Infra notes 240–245. 
 80. See Am. Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. Edwards & Angell, LLP, 
No. Civ.A. PB 00-2683, 2002 WL 1803923, at *7 (describing the defendants’ 
explanation of the co-trustees interests). 
 81. See id. (explaining the Dog Museum’s interests). 
 82. See id. at *9 (rejecting Wells Fargo Bank v. Super. Ct., 990 P.2d 591 
(Cal. 2000), and Huie v. Deshazo, 922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. 1996)). 
 83. Id. (quoting Huie v. Deshazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. 1996)).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (noting the court’s determination of standing). The court’s 
determination that a breach of the duty of care gave standing for a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim is one illustration of courts commingling the duty of care 
and fiduciary duty. Supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 87. 839 P.2d 1303 (Nev. 1992). 
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trust agreement for Adele Kate Trelease.88 The trust listed Ms. 
Trelease’s son and grandson as the main beneficiaries and 
Abraham Lichowsky as successor trustee on Ms. Trelease’s 
death.89 This case, brought by Susan Charleson as guardian ad 
litem for beneficiary Richard Lee Trelease, Ms. Trelease’s 
grandson, arose out of actions taken by Lichowsky and Hardesty 
after Ms. Trelease’s death.90 According to the plaintiffs, 
Lichowsky, as trustee, took actions that were detrimental to the 
trust and clear breaches of his fiduciary duties.91 Among other 
things, plaintiffs asserted that Hardesty negligently failed to 
advise Lichowsky of his fiduciary duties as trustee and that 
Hardesty negligently drafted the trust instrument, which allowed 
Lichowsky to make unsecured loans.92 Plaintiffs also claimed that 
Hardesty negligently failed to provide proper legal advice to Ms. 
Trelease to preserve her funds.93 
Richard Robert Trelease, Ms. Trelease’s son and beneficiary 
of the trust, and Charleson filed a complaint against Hardesty 
alleging, among other things, that Hardesty owed them “fiduciary 
and professional duties and that he had breached these duties.”94 
On appeal from a district court judgment granting Hardesty’s 
motion for summary judgment, the Treleases again asserted that 
Hardesty, as attorney for the trustee, owed them a duty to protect 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. at 1304. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 1305 (addressing actions taken by Lichowsky and Hardesty). 
 91. Id. According to the Treleases and Charleson, Lichowsky “sold the 
Nevada trust property and transferred the funds to Southern California.” Id. at 
1304. He then withdrew all of the trust funds for personal use without 
rendering an accounting of the trust assets to the Treleases. Id. Lichowsky 
promised to send an accounting of the trust property as directed by Hardesty 
but never sent it. Id. at 1305. Lichowsky later informed Hardesty that most of 
the trust assets had been removed from Nevada and invested in a Malibu ranch, 
the details of which were requested by Hardesty and not delivered to him. Id. 
Hardesty later discovered that Lichowsky had been writing bad checks. Id. 
Furthermore, Lichowsky admitted writing checks to himself from the trust. Id. 
Lichowsky filed for bankruptcy when no assets remained in the trust, which 
prompted Charleson’s claim against Hardesty. Id. 
 92. See id. (outlining plaintiffs’ complaints against Hardesty). 
 93. See id. (alleging that “Hardesty negligently failed to furnish Ms. 
Trelease with proper legal advice so that her funds would be preserved”). 
 94. Id.  
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their interests.95 The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that 
“when an attorney represents a trustee in his or her capacity as 
trustee, that attorney assumes a duty of care and fiduciary duties 
toward the beneficiaries as a matter of law.”96 The court 
remanded the case after finding questions of material fact 
regarding whether Hardesty represented Lichowsky as trustee 
and whether Hardesty breached his duties to the beneficiaries if 
he did represent Lichowsky.97  
The courts in American Kennel Club and Charleson relied on 
the rationale from a California court in Morales v. Field,98 which 
reasoned that  
in all matters connected with [the] trust a trustee is bound to 
act in the highest good faith toward all beneficiaries, and may 
not obtain any advantage over the latter by the slightest 
misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of 
any kind . . . . An attorney who acts as counsel for a trustee 
provides advice and guidance as to how that trustee may and 
must act to fulfill his [or her] obligations to all beneficiaries. It 
follows that when an attorney undertakes a relationship as 
adviser to a trustee, he in reality also assumes a relationship 
with the beneficiary akin to that between trustee and 
beneficiary.99 
Many other courts have also determined that a fiduciary’s 
attorney owes some form of duty to beneficiaries.100 The Delaware 
                                                                                                     
 95. See id. at 1306 (stating that the Treleases asserted the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment to Hardesty because Hardesty “owed them 
a duty to protect their interests”). 
 96. Id. at 1306–07 (emphasis added).  
 97. See id. at 1308 (explaining the court’s final conclusions). 
 98. 160 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).  
 99. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Later California courts have distinguished 
Morales by the fact that the attorneys made direct representations of care to 
beneficiaries or have simply held that “a fiduciary’s attorney does not owe duties 
to the fiduciary’s beneficiaries.” See ALAN NEWMAN, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, 
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ 962 (3d ed. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312, 317 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995); Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Cal. Ct. App.1990); Lasky, 
Haas, Cohler & Munter v. Super. Ct., 218 Cal. Rptr. 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)). 
 100. See, e.g., Schick v. Bach, 238 Cal. Rptr. 902, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(“Similarly, an attorney representing a trustee also assumes a duty of care 
toward the beneficiaries.”); Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713–14 
(Del. Ch. 1976) (stating that because fiduciary obligations were owed by 
attorney for trustee to beneficiaries, effectively “the beneficiaries were the 
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Chancery Court notably stated in Riggs National Bank v. 
Zimmer101 that the trustee, as a representative for the 
beneficiaries of the trust he administers, “is not the real client in 
the sense that [h]e is personally being served . . . . In effect, the 
beneficiaries were the clients . . . as much as the trustees were, 
and perhaps more so.”102 The Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers agrees with these courts that an attorney 
owes a duty of care to nonclients and is therefore liable for 
professional negligence if the attorney’s client is an executor, 
trustee, guardian, or fiduciary acting principally to perform 
similar functions for the nonclients.103 
                                                                                                     
clients [of the attorney] as much as the trustees were, and perhaps more so”); 
Gagliardo v. Caffrey, 800 N.E.2d 489, 496–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (describing 
situations under Illinois law in which an attorney may owe a duty of care to a 
third party such as a beneficiary of an estate); In re Halas, 512 N.E.2d 1276, 
1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that counsel for the executor “breached its own 
separate fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries”); Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 541 
N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 1989) (determining that beneficiaries with vested interest 
in an estate are in privity—by way of a “pass through privity” theory—with 
executor of estate, and attorney for executor may be liable in negligence to such 
beneficiaries).  
For more cases determining that attorneys owe a duty to their fiduciary-
clients’ beneficiaries, see NEWMAN, BOGERT, BOGERT & HESS, supra note 99, 
§ 962 n.103 (citing In re Estate of Shano, 869 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); 
Schmitz v. Crotty, 528 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1995); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 
354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172 (N.M. 1995); In re 
Clarkes Estate, 188 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1962); In re Guardianship of Karan, 38 
P.3d 396 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 101. 355 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976). 
 102. Id. at 713–14; see also Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 
1989-4, 8 (1989) (acknowledging that an attorney’s duties to the beneficiaries of 
an estate do “appear to exist” but do not rise to the level of implicating an 
attorney’s duty of loyalty). 
 103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000) 
(detailing circumstances under which an attorney owes a duty of care to 
nonclients for purposes of liability for professional negligence). The duty of care 
an attorney owes to nonclients when the client is a trustee, executor, guardian, 
or fiduciary is limited in several respects. Id. § 51 cmt. h. The duty of care 
should be recognized only when action by the lawyer would not violate 
applicable professional rules and the attorney’s client is one of the specified 
types of fiduciaries. Id. An attorney who only represents the fiduciary may avoid 
liability to beneficiaries as clients by making clear to beneficiaries that the 
attorney represents the fiduciary only and not the beneficiaries. Id. Liability for 
professional negligence under the attorney’s duty of care to 
nonclient-beneficiaries arises when the lawyer “knows that appropriate action 
by the lawyer is necessary to prevent or mitigate a breach of the client’s 
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Additionally, the American College of Trust and Estate 
Counsel’s (ACTEC) commentaries on Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.2 explain that an attorney representing the fiduciary 
in its fiduciary capacity owes some duties to beneficiaries despite 
the fact that an attorney does not represent them.104 ACTEC 
describes these duties as “largely restrictive in nature,” although 
it also notes that a fiduciary’s attorney may at times be obligated 
to take affirmative action to protect the beneficiary’s interests.105 
ACTEC appears to recognize more duties than the ABA Model 
Rules or the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers.106 An example of this difference is ACTEC’s 
acknowledgement that some jurisdictions consider beneficiaries 
secondary or derivative clients of the fiduciary’s attorney.107 
                                                                                                     
fiduciary duty.” Id. The stated duty applies only to breaches of fiduciary duty 
constituting crime or fraud, or to breaches in which the attorney knowingly is 
assisting or has assisted in perpetrating a crime or fraud. Id. Liability is not 
imposed when an attorney is subsequently consulted by a fiduciary to deal with 
the effects of a past breach committed before the consultation began, nor is an 
attorney in such a situation under a duty to inform beneficiaries of the breach or 
to attempt to rectify it. Id. Liability does not exist when nonclient-beneficiaries 
can reasonably protect their own rights. Id. Thus, no liability exists when a 
beneficiary of a family voting trust who is in business and has access to the 
relevant information has no need of protection by the trustee’s attorney. Id. An 
attorney is not subject to liability to beneficiaries for failing to act in a manner 
the attorney reasonably believes would violate the professional rules, which may 
depend on the relevant jurisdiction’s rules. Id. Finally, “[a]n attorney owes no 
duty to a beneficiary if recognizing such duty would create conflicting or 
inconsistent duties that might significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of 
obligations to the lawyer’s client in the circumstances of the representation.” Id. 
Similarly an attorney is not liable to a beneficiary for representing the fiduciary 
in a dispute or negotiation with the beneficiary regarding any matter that may 
affect the beneficiaries’ interests. Id. 
 104. See Am. Coll. of Trust & Estate Counsel, Commentaries on the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 36 (4th ed. 2006) (commenting that an attorney 
retained by a fiduciary may have restrictive duties, such as refraining from 
taking advantage of his position to the disadvantage of the fiduciary estate or 
beneficiaries). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Thomas Spahn, Ethics Issues Facing Trust and Estate Lawyers: 
Hypotheticals and Analyses 485 (2012), https://www.vtbar.org/User 
Files/Files/EventAds/052412.pdf (discussing the ACTEC Commentaries and the 
duties imposed on fiduciaries’ attorneys). 
 107. See Am. Coll. of Trust & Estate Counsel, supra note 104, at 36 (“Some 
courts have characterized the beneficiaries of a fiduciary estate as derivative or 
secondary clients of the lawyer for the fiduciary.”). 
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B. Differing Duties an Attorney May Owe to Beneficiaries 
The nature of the duty imposed on attorneys is important 
because it could determine what attorney actions will breach that 
duty and subject the attorney to liability to the beneficiaries. 
Although courts subject attorneys to similar liabilities by 
determining that a fiduciary’s attorney owes some duties to 
beneficiaries, they are not necessarily imposing the same duties 
on attorneys.  
For example, the court in Morales implied that an attorney 
owes the same fiduciary duties to beneficiaries that the fiduciary-
client owes to beneficiaries.108 Undertaking a relationship with 
beneficiaries “akin to that between the trustee and beneficiary” 
implies that the attorney would become a co-fiduciary with the 
attorney’s fiduciary-client.109 This suggests that the attorney 
must exercise the exact same loyalty and care owed in 
administering the trust or estate to beneficiaries,110 which would 
significantly increase an attorney’s liability exposure to the 
beneficiaries.111 Because this would produce such a drastic result, 
it is likely that the Morales court actually intended to assert that 
the attorney owed fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries.112 In fact, 
most commentators present Morales as a case in which the court 
simply determined that a fiduciary’s attorney owed fiduciary 
duties to the beneficiaries.113 
Most courts use more straightforward language to suggest 
that an attorney owes fiduciary duties to beneficiaries. The 
                                                                                                     
 108. See Morales v. Fields, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) 
(stating when an attorney advises a fiduciary, “he in reality also assumes a 
relationship with the beneficiary akin to that between trustee and beneficiary”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See supra Part II.B (outlining a fiduciary’s duties to beneficiaries in 
administering a trust or estate).  
 111. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that a fiduciary is 
subject to liability for breaching any of the fiduciary duties described above).  
 112. See Pennell, supra note 11, at 1323 (noting the Morales court’s 
language presumably “refers to the attorney’s fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiaries”). 
 113. See, e.g., id. (describing Morales as imposing fiduciary duties on a 
fiduciary’s attorney owed to beneficiaries); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 908–09 
(describing Morales as restating the “basic obligations owed by a fiduciary to a 
beneficiary” and extending those obligations to the fiduciary’s attorney). 
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Charleson court found that, as in American Kennel Club, an 
attorney for a trustee owes a duty of care to beneficiaries,114 but 
unlike American Kennel Club, the Charleson court also found 
that an attorney for a trustee owed fiduciary duties to 
beneficiaries.115 Regardless of this distinction in duties imposed 
on the attorney, in both cases the court subjected the attorney to 
the beneficiaries’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty.116 Similar to 
Charleson, the court in In re Estate of Halas117 determined that 
counsel for an executor breached duties to the beneficiaries 
classified as “fiduciary duties.”118 
These cases exemplify the “joint-client” theory of fiduciary 
representation.119 Under the joint-client theory, the attorney owes 
                                                                                                     
 114. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (explaining the 
Charleson court’s conclusion that a trustee’s attorney owes a duty of care to the 
beneficiaries). 
 115. Compare Am. Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. Edward & Angell, 
LLP, No. Civ.A. PB 00-2683, 2002 WL 1803923, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 
2002) (attributing a duty of care on the attorney for the fiduciary), with 
Charleson v. Hardesty, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306–07 (Nev. 1992) (attributing both a 
duty of care and fiduciary duties on the fiduciary’s attorney). 
 116.  See Am. Kennel Club, 2002 WL 1803923, at *10 (concluding 
plaintiff-beneficiary had standing to bring claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
against the defendant); Charleson 839 P.2d at 1308 (same). This is an example 
of courts allowing beneficiaries to bring separate claims for legal malpractice 
and fiduciary duties, resulting in an attorney’s possible liability for damages to 
beneficiaries. Supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 117. 512 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
 118. Id. at 1280. 
 119. See Lee, supra note 4, at 477 (noting that some jurisdictions apply a 
“joint-client” approach, including the Supreme Court of Nevada in Charleson).  
The joint-client theory is best illustrated by Professor Hazard’s triangle 
metaphor for representing a fiduciary. Id. Leg one of the triangle is the 
attorney–client relationship. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer 
Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 15–19 
(1987). Leg two is the fiduciary–beneficiary relationship. Id. Leg three is the 
attorney–beneficiary relationship. Id. Professor Hazard argues that the 
beneficiaries and fiduciary have identical interests, therefore the attorney–
client relationship should be treated as analogous to “joint representation in 
which a lawyer represents two or more closely connected parties, one of whom 
serves as spokesperson.” Id. at 36. The triangle metaphor is illustrated in 
language from In re Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Wash. 1985). See 
Lee, supra note 4, at 478. In Larson, the court opined that “the fiduciary duties 
of the attorney run not only to the personal representative but also to the heirs.” 
Larson, 694 P.2d at 1054.  
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the same duties to both beneficiaries and the fiduciary-client.120 
The joint-client theory usually acknowledges that there is a 
“primary client” and a “derivative client.”121 However, 
applications of the theory do not always agree on whether the 
fiduciary should be the primary or derivative client.122 For 
example, the Riggs court implied that the beneficiary should be 
the primary client by announcing that the beneficiaries were the 
clients perhaps more so than the fiduciary.123 Whereas the 
primary client is entitled to all of the duties a traditional client 
receives, under the joint-client theory, the derivative client also 
receives certain duties as a joint client.124 Although the nature 
and extent of duties owed to the derivative client are unclear,125 
attorneys representing a fiduciary may still face potential 
conflicts of interest or potential liability for breaching these 
duties.126 Even though courts use different language to impose a 
duty of care and fiduciary duties on a fiduciary’s attorney, the 
result is the same in that a fiduciary’s attorney may face liability 
for professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duties.127 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Lee, supra note 4, at 477 (explaining that under the joint-client 
theory, “a beneficiary is entitled to essentially the same duties as the fiduciary 
is entitled, effectively making her a client of the attorney and thus a joint-client 
of the fiduciary”). 
 121. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING § 2.7 (3d ed. 2011) (Supp. 2013) (“[I]t can be said that, while the 
fiduciary is the lawyer’s ‘primary’ client, the beneficiary is a ‘derivative’ client 
and entitled to loyalty on a par, or almost on a par, with other clients.”). 
 122. See Lee, supra note 4, at 478 (describing the disagreement of multiple 
courts as to who is the primary and who is the derivative client). 
 123. See Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713–14 (Del. Ch. 1976) 
(describing beneficiaries as the clients of the fiduciary’s attorney). 
 124. See Lee, supra note 4, at 478–79 (explaining duties owed to the primary 
client and derivative client are not entirely the same). 
 125. See id. at 478 (“It is unclear whether there is a duty of competence, a 
duty of diligence, a duty of communication, a duty of confidentiality, or a duty of 
loyalty to the derivative client.”). 
 126. See id. (discussing the implications of violating duties to a derivative 
client and the possibility for conflicts of interest). 
 127. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (expressing the possibility for 
monetary damages awards rendered against attorneys). This is another example 
of the way courts conflate the duty of care and fiduciary duties, while inducing 
the same effect on the attorney’s liability exposure. See supra Part II.A 
(acknowledging that, despite the distinction between a duty of care and 
fiduciary duties, a breach of either may result in a damages award). 
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IV. The Traditional Approach: Attorneys Owe No Duties to 
Beneficiaries 
In contrast to the joint-client theory, a majority of 
jurisdictions follow the “traditional theory,” which provides that 
an attorney for a fiduciary represents only the fiduciary and owes 
no duties to the fiduciary’s beneficiaries.128 Under this theory, the 
attorney’s only obligations to a beneficiary are those “negative 
duties” an attorney owes to all third parties, such as the duty not 
to make false or misleading statements to a third party.129 Many 
cases and state statutes, as well as the American Bar Association, 
also prefer the traditional approach.130 
A. Cases Supporting the Traditional Approach 
The traditional approach is best laid out in the often-cited 
Goldberg v. Frye131 and Spinner v. Nutt,132 although many other 
jurisdictions and cases apply some version of the traditional 
approach as well.133 
                                                                                                     
 128. See Correira, supra note 6, at 9 (“The majority of states . . . have a 
straightforward rule that, in all respects, an attorney hired by a trustee owes a 
fiduciary duty to the trustee alone.”); Lee, supra note 4, at 471 (describing the 
“traditional approach” as the “most prevalent” approach among states that has 
provided a clear ruling). 
 129. Lee, supra note 4, at 475. 
 130. See infra note 133 (listing cases that have determined an attorney owes 
no duties to the fiduciary-client’s beneficiaries); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing ABA formal opinion 94-380 and various state statutes). 
 131. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258 (1990). Most other jurisdictions that have 
adopted the traditional approach have relied on California’s case law, 
particularly Goldberg v. Frye. Lee, supra note 4, at 472. 
 132. 417 Mass. 549 (1994). 
 133. See Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
the lower court’s ruling that, in Ohio, an attorney cannot be held liable by third 
parties as a result of services performed on behalf of a client unless the third 
party is in privity with the client, or the attorney acts with malice); Wells Fargo 
v. Super. Ct., 22 Cal. 4th 201, 212–13 (2000) (noting that no attorney–client 
relationship existed between beneficiaries and trustee’s attorney, thus, no duties 
are imposed on the attorney); In re Estate of Brooks, 596 P.2d 1220, 1226 (1979) 
(emphasizing that trustee’s attorney does not owe a duty to beneficiary unless 
he was involved in fraud); First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Whitener, 715 So. 2d 
979, 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (determining that the trustee retained 
counsel for its own benefit and not for the benefit of beneficiaries, therefore, no 
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In Goldberg, the California Court of Appeals reviewed claims 
by legatees (beneficiaries) of an estate against the administrator 
of the estate and the administrator’s attorney.134 In 1958, Philip 
Hahn divorced his wife, Sadie, and executed a property 
settlement agreement that provided monthly payments to Sadie 
and required him to devise one-third of his estate to her on his 
death.135 Philip later created a unitrust and a charitable 
foundation to which he transferred substantial assets over the 
years prior to his death in 1975.136 His will provided for Sadie, his 
current wife Muriel, and created $5,000 legacies (devises of 
money) for his eight grandchildren.137 It also provided for a 
$50,000 legacy for his longtime nurse, Linnea Rydberg 
Goldberg.138  
Sadie filed suit against Philip’s estate, the foundation, and 
the unitrust, claiming that Philip’s inter vivos transfers to those 
                                                                                                     
duties are owed to beneficiaries by the attorney); Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, Mo. 
v. Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of Belleville, 633 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(finding estate attorney has no duty to beneficiary due to “potentially 
adversarial relationship” between estate’s and beneficiary’s interests); Neal v. 
Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (emphasizing the primary 
purpose of the attorney’s relationship with the executor was to assist in the 
proper administration of the estate involving matters adversarial to the 
plaintiff–beneficiary); Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 258 (N.J. 2001) 
(noting that attorney for a fiduciary owes duties only to the fiduciary and not 
the estate or the beneficiaries except in “egregious circumstances such as fraud, 
collusion or malice, or where a separate duty to those beneficiaries has been 
undertaken” by the attorney); Roberts v. Fearey, 162 Or. App. 546, 548 (1999) 
(holding that defendant did not owe a duty to protect beneficiaries from 
economic loss and thus, was not liable for malpractice as a matter of law); Huie 
v. Deshazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. 1996) (applying attorney–client 
relationship to prevent beneficiary from compelling discovery of confidential 
materials from attorney for the trustee, while maintaining the rule that the 
trustee must disclose material facts to its representation of the trust to 
beneficiaries); Thomas v. Vinson & Elkins, 859 S.W.2d 617, 621–22, 624 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1993) (noting that no fiduciary relationship exists between the trustee’s 
attorney and beneficiary of the trust). 
 134. See Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1266 (1990) (discussing 
claims brought by legatees against attorney for estate representative Whelan). 
 135. See id. at 1261 (describing events that took place at the conclusion of 
the marriage). 
 136. See id. at 1261–62 (noting Philip’s activities with his property prior to 
his death). 
 137. Id. at 1262. 
 138. Id. 
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entities violated their marital settlement agreement.139 The 
parties reached a settlement agreement obligating jointly the 
foundation, the Estate of Hahn, and Muriel to make installment 
payments to Sadie after replacing Muriel Hahn with Vincent 
Whelan as administrator.140 When the estate was unable to make 
timely payments, the probate court authorized Whelan to enter 
into a reimbursement agreement in which the foundation 
advanced funds to Sadie that the estate would reimburse.141 The 
legatees, Goldberg and Philip’s grandchildren, challenged later 
accountings by Whelan after indication that reimbursing the 
foundation for funds paid to Sadie would make it impossible to 
pay the devises to the legatees.142 After obtaining counsel in 1985, 
the legatees objected to Whelan’s fifth and sixth accounts at 
hearings, and the court denied their request for distribution from 
the estate.143 
The legatees then filed complaints against Whelan and his 
attorney, Frank A. Frye III, in 1987, alleging breach of fiduciary 
duty, legal malpractice, extrinsic fraud, and negligence.144 The 
legatees claimed that the defendants acted imprudently in 
negotiating the settlement and reimbursement agreements.145 
They also asserted that they did not challenge the action taken in 
1980 because they had not received proper notice of the likely 
effect of these agreements on their estate payout expectancies.146 
The trial court, ruling in favor of the defendants, noted that Frye 
“served only as attorney for the administrator, and owing no duty 
to the legatees could not be liable to them in negligence.”147 
The California Court of Appeals clarified that the legatees’ 
claim against Frye was that he negligently failed to notify them 
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. (addressing claims brought against Frye and Whelan). 
 140. See id. (explaining the resolution of Sadie’s first claim).  
 141. See id. (detailing the reimbursement agreement reached by the estate 
and the foundation). 
 142. See id. at 1263 (noting an initial controversy between the legatees’ 
interests and Whelan’s interests). 
 143. See id. (addressing challenges to the fifth and sixth accountings but not 
to any prior accountings). 
 144. See id. (noting claims brought by plaintiffs). 
 145. See id. (explaining legatees’ arguments). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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of the significance of the 1980 hearings, specifically, that he failed 
to exercise reasonable care in the performance of services for the 
estate beneficiaries.148 The court found that an attorney for the 
administrator of an estate represents the administrator and not 
the estate.149 Thus, by taking on duties to the administrator, the 
attorney “undertakes to perform services which may benefit 
legatees of the estate, but he has no contractual privity with the 
beneficiaries of the estate” and cannot be held liable to them for 
malpractice.150 
The court determined that the plaintiffs would need to base a 
claim for malpractice on principles from which a duty may arise 
absent privity of contract and not on the attorney–client 
relationship.151 It emphasized that the most important inquiry is 
whether the primary purpose of hiring the attorney is for the 
benefit of the plaintiff.152 In this case, the court concluded that 
Whelan and Frye did not enter into the attorney’s contract for the 
principal purpose of benefitting the legatees.153 The fact that 
Frye’s services benefitted or damaged third parties did not give 
rise to a claim of malpractice based on Frye’s negligence because 
no duty existed.154 Finally, the court acknowledged that a 
fiduciary’s attorney represents only one party: the fiduciary.155 It 
                                                                                                     
 148. See id. (explaining plaintiffs’ claim that Frye breached a duty of care 
owed to beneficiaries). 
 149. See id. (determining that the attorney’s client is the estate 
representative only). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 1268 (citing 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.11 
(3d ed. 1989) for principles that may give rise to a duty absent privity of 
contract). 
 152. See id. (“The predominant inquiry . . . is whether the principal purpose 
of the attorney’s retention is to provide legal services for the benefit of the 
plaintiff.”). 
 153. See id. (“We find nothing to indicate that this attorney’s retention was 
in any respect different from the typical retention of counsel by the fiduciary of a 
decedent’s estate.”). 
 154. See id. (noting that when benefitting beneficiaries is not the principal 
purpose of an attorney’s contract with a fiduciary, if the beneficiaries are in fact 
benefitted then they are “incidental beneficiaries,” which is not enough to 
impose a duty upon the attorney (citing 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
§ 7.11 (3d ed. 1989); Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg, 77 Cal. App. 3d 60, 67–68 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978))). 
 155. See id. at 1269 (emphasizing the primary importance of this case). 
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noted the dangers of concluding that the attorney, through 
performing services for the administrator and by communicating 
with the estate beneficiaries, subjects himself to negligence 
claims from beneficiaries.156 Beneficiaries are entitled to fair 
administration by the fiduciary but “are not owed a duty directly 
by the fiduciary’s attorney.”157 Therefore, the court upheld 
summary judgment in favor of Frye (and in favor of Whelan).158 
In Spinner, four of sixty-eight income and remainder 
beneficiaries of a testamentary trust established under the will of 
Damon Lyons (Damon trust) asserted that the trustees’ attorneys 
owed them a duty of care.159 The defendants were the attorneys 
for the two trustees of the Damon trust.160 They claimed that they 
owed duties only to their clients, the trustees, and not to the 
beneficiaries.161 
More than 90% of the Damon trust was comprised of stock in 
the Salem News Publishing Company.162 In 1987 and 1988, the 
trustees received offers to purchase the stock.163 The trustees 
could not come to an agreement on whether to accept the offer, 
and in the interim, the value of the publishing company declined 
substantially.164 In bringing claims against the trustees’ 
attorneys, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, breach of 
contract because they were intended beneficiaries of the contracts 
between the trustees and the attorneys.165 They also made 
                                                                                                     
 156. See id. (“Particularly in the case of services rendered for the fiduciary of 
a decedent’s estate, we would apprehend great danger in finding stray duties in 
favor of beneficiaries.”). 
 157. Id.; see also NEWMAN, BOGERT, BOGERT & HESS, supra note 99, § 962 
n.103 (noting California cases that followed with the traditional no duty 
approach stated in Goldberg). 
 158. See Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1269 (1990) (stating the 
court’s final disposition).  
 159. See Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 550–51 (1994) (describing 
plaintiffs’ claim against attorneys for trustees of the Damon trust). 
 160. Id. at 551. 
 161. See id. (explaining the foundation of the attorney’s main argument). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (noting the primary cause of the plaintiffs’ claims). 
 165. See id. at 552 (specifying the claims brought against attorneys). 
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negligence claims stating that they foreseeably relied on the 
attorneys.166 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court acknowledged that to 
sustain the negligence claims, plaintiffs must show that 
defendants owed them a duty of care, such as that which arises 
from an attorney–client relationship.167 It was undisputed that no 
direct attorney–client relationship existed between the 
plaintiff-beneficiaries and the defendant-attorneys.168 The 
plaintiffs asserted that a duty existed because the defendants 
should have foreseen that the plaintiffs would rely on the 
defendants’ advice to protect their interests.169 The court found 
that, although an attorney may owe a duty to nonclients who the 
attorney knows will rely on services rendered,170 it is “less likely 
to impose a duty to nonclients” where an attorney is also “under 
an independent and potentially conflicting duty to a client.”171 
The court explained that a trustee may be required to make 
difficult decisions in administering the trust regarding duties to 
the beneficiaries, and the attorney’s job is to guide the trustee in 
making these decisions.172 Focusing on the potential conflict of 
interests,173 the court concluded: 
That the interests of the trustee and the interests of the 
beneficiaries may at times conflict cannot seriously be 
disputed. Should we decide that a trustee’s attorney owes a 
duty not only to the trustee but also to the trust beneficiaries, 
                                                                                                     
 166. See id. at 551 (stating other claims made).  
 167. See id. at 552 (noting the importance of an attorney–client relationship 
for purposes of the duty of care).  
 168. See id. (noting a brief court clarification on the contested facts of the 
case). 
 169. See id. (“The plaintiffs claim that . . . defendants owed them a duty 
because it was foreseeable that the plaintiffs would rely on the defendants’ 
advice to protect their interests.”). 
 170. Id. (citing Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 524 
(1989)).  
 171. Id. (quoting Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55, 63 (1983)). 
 172. See id. at 552–53 (noting a trustee must make difficult decisions and “a 
trustee’s attorney guides the trustee in this decision-making process”). 
 173. Id. at 554 (citing DeRoza v. Arter, 416 Mass. 377, 383–84 (1993); 
Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 524 (1989); Page v. 
Frazier, 388 Mass. 55, 63 (1983)). 
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conflicting loyalties could impermissibly interfere with the 
attorney’s task of advising the trustee. This we refuse to do.174 
The court also noted that imposing duties on a trustee’s attorney 
to beneficiaries might create situations antithetical to the 
Massachusetts disciplinary rule that requires an attorney to 
preserve the confidences of his client in these circumstances.175 
Referencing Goldberg, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
also found that the plaintiffs were not intended third-party 
beneficiaries.176 The plaintiffs did not allege that the parties 
intended to confer the benefit of legal counsel on them and thus 
could not rely solely on their status as trust beneficiaries for this 
                                                                                                     
 174. See id. at 553 (addressing the current case as it applies to 
Massachusetts disciplinary rules). 
 175. See id. at 554 (explaining that “the disciplinary rules which govern 
attorney conduct in Massachusetts require in the circumstances of this case that 
an attorney preserve the secrets and confidences gained in the course of 
representing a client”). 
 176. See id. at 555 (emphasizing that the fact that a beneficiary was 
benefitted or harmed does not, without more, make any beneficiary an intended 
third-party beneficiary of the attorney–client contract). The doctrine of intended 
third-party beneficiaries comes from contract law. Fuller, supra note 5, at 50. In 
a legal malpractice context, the intended third-party beneficiary approach 
recognizes that an attorney and client, as promisor and promisee, may create 
rights in an estate beneficiary. Id. at 51. Therefore, when circumstances indicate 
that the agreement was made for the beneficiary’s benefit, an attorney owes a 
duty to beneficiaries. Id. 
Traditional barriers remain in force in situations where adversarial 
relations may arise. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court explained the rationale for 
these barriers in Pelham v. Griesheimer, stating specifically, “In the area of 
legal malpractice, the attorney’s obligations to his client must remain 
paramount.” 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1982). Realizing the many scenarios in 
which the parties’ interests may collide, the court refused to “create such a wide 
range of potential conflicts by imposing such duties upon an attorney in favor of 
a non-client, unless the intent to benefit the third party is clearly evident.” Id. at 
100. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on Pelham in Neal v. Baker, 194 Ill. App. 
3d 485 (1990), in which it held that a named beneficiary of a testator’s estate 
could not bring a malpractice action against the estate representative’s 
attorney, hired to assist in administering the estate, without showing that the 
attorney–client contract was entered into with the specific intent to directly 
benefit the plaintiff as a third party beneficiary. Id. at 487–88. 
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claim.177 Such a position would be contrary to what would 
traditionally be expected of trustees seeking legal counsel.178  
Finally, the court stated that the beneficiaries in Spinner did 
have some opportunity for recourse.179 The beneficiaries could 
bring actions against the individual trustees if the plaintiffs could 
prove a breach of fiduciary duties owed to them.180 The trustees 
could then bring claims against their attorneys.181 Indeed, the 
trial judge took judicial notice of pending matters against the 
trustees.182 
B. State Statutes and ABA Formal Opinion 94-380 
Many states have statutes that follow the traditional theory 
in identifying the attorney’s client when the attorney represents a 
fiduciary.183 Settling the question of whom the attorney 
represents alleviates an attorney’s liability for claims brought by 
a nonclient-plaintiff based on breach of duty within an attorney–
client relationship.184 If an attorney represents a third party and 
thus owes duties to the third party, the third party may have 
                                                                                                     
 177. See Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 554 (1994) (acknowledging the 
invalidity of beneficiaries’ argument for why fiduciary’s attorney owed them a 
duty). 
 178. See id. at 555–56 (noting that a plaintiff-beneficiary must normally 
show that the parties entered into a contract primarily for the beneficiary’s 
benefit). 
 179. See id. at 556 (“It bears repeating that this result does not leave the 
beneficiaries without recourse; they can pursue an action directly against the 
trustees if they can show a breach of their fiduciary duties.”). 
 180. See id. at 557 (“[T]his result does not leave the beneficiaries without 
recourse; they can pursue an action directly against the trustees if they can 
show a breach of their fiduciary duties.”); Correira, supra note 6, at 12 (detailing 
the facts of Spinner and emphasizing the beneficiaries’ options as explained by 
the court). 
 181. See Spinner, 417 Mass. at 555; Correira, supra note 6, at 12 (noting the 
trustees’ options after beneficiaries bring a claim against it). 
 182. See Spinner, 417 Mass. at 555 (highlighting legal actions pending 
against the trustees in the matter). 
 183. See Lee, supra note 4, at 472 (commenting on state legislation and 
policy regarding an attorney’s representation of a fiduciary).  
 184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. a 
(2000) (discussing duties owed to clients and the client’s ability to enforce such 
duties by legal claims against the attorney). 
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standing to bring claims against the attorney for breaching those 
duties.185 State statutes express a state’s attempt at clarifying 
who an attorney represents and, therefore, to whom an attorney 
owes duties as a result of the attorney–client relationship.186 
In South Carolina, an attorney whose client is a fiduciary 
owes no duties to any beneficiary or other party interested in the 
trust, estate, or fiduciary property unless specifically stated in 
the attorney’s contract.187 Similarly, an Ohio statute says that, 
absent an express agreement to the contrary, a fiduciary’s 
attorney has no obligation or duties in tort, contract, or otherwise 
to any third party to whom the fiduciary owes fiduciary duties.188 
It goes on to state that the term “fiduciary,” as used in Title LVIII 
labeled “Trusts,” means a “trustee of an express trust or an 
executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate.”189 A Florida 
statute provides that “the personal representative is the client 
rather than the estate or the beneficiaries.”190 Michigan’s Probate 
Court rules declare that an attorney “filing an appearance on 
behalf of a fiduciary shall represent the fiduciary”191 and not the 
beneficiary or the estate.192 Finally, although not a statute, a 
Kentucky Bar Association ethics opinion expressed its favor for 
the position that an attorney for a fiduciary represents only the 
                                                                                                     
 185. See id. § 51 cmt. a (clarifying that an attorney is liable to nonclients 
when he violates a duty to such nonclients in the rare circumstances such duties 
may be imposed).  
 186. See Lee, supra note 4, at 472 (explaining state statutes and their 
clarification on who the attorney represents in each state). 
 187. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-09 (2011) (stating that a fiduciary’s attorney 
owes no duties to beneficiaries absent language in a contract, which is intended 
to be “declaratory of the common law” and governs relationships between 
attorneys and persons serving as fiduciaries). 
 188. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.16(A) (2007) (explaining the fiduciary 
duties of attorney or fiduciary). 
 189. Id. § 5815.16(B). 
 190. FLA. STAT. ANN. Bar Rule 4-1.7 cmt. (2013). 
 191. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. Rule 5.117(A) (2012). 
 192. See id. Rule 5.117(A) cmt. (clarifying that the attorney does not 
represent the estate, thereby representing beneficiaries, but only represents the 
fiduciary or trustee); Lee, supra note 4, at 472, 486 (detailing Michigan Probate 
Court Rule 5.117(A) and its comment, which state that an attorney does not 
represent the beneficiary). 
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fiduciary and owes no excess duties to beneficiaries outside of 
those owed to all other third parties.193 
In ABA Formal Opinion 94-380, the ABA expressed its favor 
for a version of the traditional approach.194 It states that simply 
because a fiduciary-client has duties to beneficiaries “does not 
impose parallel obligations on the lawyer, or otherwise expand or 
supersede the lawyer’s responsibilities under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”195 Although the opinion does not 
specifically say that an attorney represents only the fiduciary-
client, it implies this idea by explaining that the attorney can 
voluntarily “undertake” to represent a fiduciary only.196 The ABA 
takes the position that an attorney may choose to represent the 
beneficiaries or the estate, but he may also only represent the 
fiduciary.197 It does not address the issue of potential conflicts of 
interest that may arise by representing multiple clients.198 It 
does, however, suggest that the law does not force an attorney 
into representation of the beneficiaries by nature of his 
representation of the fiduciary.199 The ABA emphasizes this idea 
in its report of the Special Study Committee on Professional 
Responsibility.200 The report states that an attorney’s only client 
is the fiduciary unless the lawyer chooses to represent the estate 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. KBA E-401 4–5 (1997) (adopting various 
views expressed in ABA Formal Opinion 94-380 and ACTEC’s commentaries on 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as advisory to Kentucky courts). 
 194. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 
(1994) (recognizing that the Model Rules reflect the majority view of 
jurisdictions, which holds that an attorney who represents a fiduciary does not 
also represent the beneficiaries). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  
 197. See id. (explaining that this opinion addresses only those circumstances 
where an attorney “undertakes” to represent only the fiduciary and not 
beneficiaries or the estate as an entity). 
 198. See id. (“We do not . . . deal with the conflict of interest issues that may 
arise when a lawyer undertakes simultaneously to represent both fiduciary and 
beneficiary with regard to the same subject matter.”). 
 199. See id. (insinuating that the lawyer may choose to represent only the 
fiduciary or the fiduciary and beneficiaries). 
 200. See ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 3, at 
831 (addressing the issue of who is the attorney’s client if attorney is asked by 
the fiduciary to advise it as an executor or trustee and the attorney has not 
represented any of the beneficiaries). 
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or trust as an entity and reaches an express agreement with the 
fiduciary to that effect.201 The attorney’s client is the “fiduciary 
qua fiduciary,” or in the fiduciary capacity of executor or trustee 
as opposed to an entity capacity or individual capacity.202 
The ABA holds all attorneys as bound by the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) with no exception for 
attorneys representing fiduciaries.203 The fact that the fiduciary-
client has obligations to beneficiaries of a trust or estate does not 
“expand or limit the lawyer’s obligations to the fiduciary client 
under the Model Rules.”204 Similarly, an attorney is not obliged to 
satisfy the duties imposed under the Model Rules regarding 
beneficiaries.205 The ABA does not impose on the lawyer any 
additional obligations towards the beneficiaries that the lawyer 
would not owe to all third parties.206 It specifically proclaims that, 
although the attorney is prohibited from “actively participating in 
criminal or fraudulent activity or active concealment of a client’s 
wrongdoing,” the attorney’s duty of confidentiality is not 
mitigated simply because the client is a fiduciary.207 This 
approach essentially puts beneficiaries on an equal playing field 
                                                                                                     
 201. See id. (explaining that an attorney may elect to represent an estate or 
trust as an entity, otherwise, by default, the attorney represents only the 
fiduciary).  
 202. Id. 
 203. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 
(1994) (applying the strictures of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
universally to all attorneys); id. at n.6 (detailing the many limitations the Model 
Rules place on attorneys representing fiduciaries). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. (noting that an attorney, with scope of representation and duties 
defined under Model Rule 1.2, having a duty to “diligently represent the 
fiduciary” under Model Rule 1.3, and to preserve in confidence communications 
between attorney and fiduciary under Model Rule 1.6, does not owe parallel 
duties to beneficiaries); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 904–05 (discussing ABA 94-380 
and noting that under the Model Rules, an attorney’s duties of loyalty and care 
“run only to the fiduciary”). 
 206. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 
(1994) (noting specifically that the obligation to keep a client’s confidences under 
Model Rule 1.6 is not altered by the client being a fiduciary); Tuttle, supra note 
2, at 905 (“[T]he lawyer has no greater duty to protect the beneficiary from 
fiduciary overreaching than she has to protect any other third party . . . . [T]he 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty extends only to her client; the client’s beneficiary stands 
outside the protective sphere.”). 
 207. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380. 
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with other third parties regarding duties owed by the fiduciary’s 
attorney.208 The difference between beneficiaries and other third 
parties arises in duties owed by the fiduciary itself.209 Similarly, 
the mandatory and optional withdrawal rules in Model Rule 1.16 
will not apply to beneficiaries’ criminal or fraudulent conduct to 
force attorney withdrawal because the ABA determines the 
attorney not to represent the beneficiaries unless he chooses to do 
so.210 
C. Attorney’s Duties to Third Parties Generally 
As noted in ABA Formal Opinion 94-380, an attorney owes 
no additional duties to beneficiaries that he would not owe to 
other third parties.211 Although the ABA specified that attorneys 
for fiduciaries owe the same duties to all third parties, whether or 
not they are beneficiaries, courts holding that an attorney owes 
no duty to beneficiaries imply the same.212 In a sense, these 
courts determine that an attorney owes no special duty to 
beneficiaries outside of those duties owed to all third parties.213 It 
would be ludicrous, after all, to presume that these courts have 
stripped attorneys of duties owed to all third parties merely by 
determining that an attorney does not owe special duties to his 
fiduciary-client’s beneficiaries. This presents the question: what 
                                                                                                     
 208. See id. (emphasizing that an attorney owes beneficiaries no different 
duties than or additional duties to those owed to every third party to the 
attorney–client relationship). 
 209. See id. (noting that a fiduciary owes duties to beneficiaries only, and 
not to any other third party). 
 210. See id. (discussing how the operation of Model Rule 1.16 does not 
depend on the client’s status as a fiduciary, and an attorney’s duties to clients 
under the Model Rules are not applied to third parties). 
 211. See id. (equating duties an attorney owes to beneficiaries and other 
third parties). 
 212. See Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 552 (1994) (explaining that a 
trustee’s attorney does not owe a duty to beneficiaries giving rise to a claim for 
professional negligence, but recognizing that an attorney is not “absolutely 
insulated from liability to nonclients”). 
 213. See ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 3, at 
834–35 (discussing that some courts have found attorneys owe some duty to 
beneficiaries, which serves to bar certain conduct, not “impose affirmative 
duties”). Similarly, an attorney’s duties to all third parties serve to bar conduct, 
hence the term “negative duties.” Infra notes 214–217. 
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duties does an attorney owe beneficiaries by virtue of being third 
parties? 
Although some courts classify the duties an attorney owes to 
a fiduciary-client’s beneficiaries as exceptions to the traditional 
theory, these exceptions are nothing more than violations of the 
“negative duties” that an attorney owes all third parties.214 These 
negative duties owed to all third parties include: (1) the duty not 
to “embarrass, harass, or violate the legal rights of a third party”; 
(2) the duty to avoid making false or misleading statements to 
third parties; (3) the duty to not advise a client to commit or 
assist a client in committing a fraudulent or criminal act against 
a third party; and (4) the duty to notify third parties who believe 
they are clients of the attorney that they are not represented and 
are not in an attorney–client relationship with the attorney.215 
These are essentially prohibitions against certain kinds of 
attorney conduct,216 not impositions of affirmative duties.217 
When representing a fiduciary, the two most commonly 
violated negative duties are the duty to not make false or 
misleading statements to third parties and the duty to not assist 
or advise a client to commit a crime or fraud against a third 
party.218 An attorney may violate the duty to not make false or 
misleading statements to a third party when an attorney makes 
“affirmative representations of care” to beneficiaries or other 
third parties.219 Any statement of assurance may mislead third 
parties to assume that their interests are being protected and will 
likely result in the creation of a new fiduciary relationship 
                                                                                                     
 214. See Lee, supra note 4, at 475 (discussing the negative duties of an 
attorney). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 3, at 
834 (“[T]he duties that the lawyer for the fiduciary owes to a beneficiary who is 
not a client consist of prohibitions against certain types of conduct by the 
lawyer.”).  
 217. See id. at 834–35 (explaining that duties a fiduciary’s attorney may owe 
to beneficiaries act “to bar certain conduct by the lawyer, not to impose 
affirmative duties to advocate or otherwise to represent actively the interests of 
the beneficiaries”). 
 218. See Lee, supra note 4, at 475 (explaining the most violated negative 
duties). 
 219. Id. 
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between the attorney and the third party.220 Furthermore, an 
attorney may violate this duty by actively concealing or assisting 
in the concealment of a client’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to 
beneficiaries.221  
When an attorney participates in a breach of a client’s 
fiduciary duty, it is a violation of the negative duty to not assist 
or counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity 
against a third party.222 An attorney does not breach this duty 
when merely giving legal advice to a fiduciary.223 The attorney 
must “actively [collude] with the trustee in breaching the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties.”224 An attorney is generally not 
required to disclose the breach to the beneficiary or prevent the 
breach from happening.225 Therefore, mere knowledge of the 
fiduciary-client’s breach does not subject the attorney to liability 
for active participation.226 
                                                                                                     
 220. See id. (exemplifying ways in which the duty to not make false or 
misleading statements may be violated). 
 221. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2012) (stating a lawyer 
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a third person or 
fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to 
prevent committing or assisting to commit a crime or fraud on the person); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) 
(emphasizing, in footnote 6, that an attorney may not conceal, or actively assist 
in concealing, a client’s breach of fiduciary duty); ABA Special Study Comm. on 
Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 3, at 837 (noting that an attorney cannot cover 
up or assist in a cover-up of breaches of a client’s fiduciary duty).  
 222. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (stating a lawyer shall not 
counsel or assist a client to engage in activity the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 
(1994) (emphasizing, in footnote 6, that an attorney may not participate in a 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty); ABA Special Study Comm. on Prof’l 
Responsibility, supra note 3, at 836 (noting that an attorney cannot participate 
in “noncriminal, nonfraudulent breaches” of a client’s fiduciary duty); Lee, supra 
note 4, at 476 (discussing violations of the duty to not assist a client to commit 
fraud or crime). 
 223. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (noting the “critical 
distinction” between presenting the client with analysis of the legal aspects of 
certain conduct); Lee, supra note 4, at 476 (highlighting that it is insufficient for 
an attorney to breach this duty by merely giving legal advice to a fiduciary). 
 224. Lee, supra note 4, at 476. 
 225. See id. (“There is no requirement that the attorney must prevent the 
breach or inform the beneficiary of the breach.”). 
 226. See id. (detailing that the law does not prohibit nondisclosure of a 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty “although nondisclosure may be morally 
questionable”); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
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Although this Note discusses the negative duties outlined 
above in their relation to fiduciaries’ attorneys and beneficiaries, 
remember that they apply equally in different circumstances to 
all other third-party–attorney interactions.227 
V. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Approach 
A. Advantages of Imposing Duties 
Courts impose duties on a fiduciary’s attorney because courts 
recognize that the available remedies to injured third parties may 
be inadequate.228 The duties are imposed with the goal of 
deterring attorneys’ negligent conduct.229 Subjecting an attorney 
to the possibility of liability for claims of breach of fiduciary duty 
or professional negligence promotes the social policy of 
“compensating innocent victims and preventing lack of care in 
attorney actions”230 and forces them to absorb the costs of their 
negligence.231 Similarly, it promotes the economic policies of 
“efficiency and risk allocation,” which decreases injury to third-
party beneficiaries.232  
                                                                                                     
380 (1994) (explaining that under Model Rule 1.6, an attorney may not disclose 
a client’s breach of fiduciary duty—although some jurisdictions are lessening 
the standard to allow this disclosure, it is still not required). 
 227. See Lee, supra note 4, at 475 (acknowledging that these negative duties 
are owed to all third parties); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) (“These rules apply to a lawyer with a fiduciary client 
to the same extent as, but no farther than, they apply in any other 
lawyer/tribunal/third party scenario.”). 
 228. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 43 (asserting that many courts loosen the 
privity requirement in finding attorneys owe a duty of care to beneficiaries 
because beneficiaries have little remedy if legally injured in the trusts and 
estates context). 
 229. See id. (explaining the theories of attorney liability to third parties and 
reasons why this liability exists). 
 230. Id. at 49. These policies are promoted because attorneys have the 
ability to take out insurance policies making them better able than third parties 
to insulate themselves from serious losses. Id. at n.115. Additionally, attorneys 
are more equipped to assess the risks due to their knowledge and skill. Id. 
 231. See id. at 58 (explaining that an attorney is forced to bear the cost of his 
own negligence, which “[deters] legal malpractice in general,” by providing 
remedies to beneficiaries as innocent victims of negligent attorneys). 
 232. Id. at 49. The economic policies justify imposing duties on an attorney 
because “attorneys are better able to insulate themselves from heavy losses than 
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Additionally, the theory that injured beneficiaries are in 
direct privity with attorneys by way of an attorney–client 
relationship (a joint-client theory)233—and the similar “pass 
through privity” theory234—“[acknowledge] the scope of a 
fiduciary relationship and an attorney’s proper role without 
painting it too broadly.”235 Establishing that attorneys owe a duty 
of care under these approaches has the added benefit of providing 
a degree of certainty for attorneys because they only owe a duty 
to those involved in a fiduciary relationship with the hiring 
client.236  
Finally, some scholars assert that because an attorney would 
disclose relevant information about the administration of the 
estate to all parties involved, these theories alleviate the 
                                                                                                     
are innocent third parties due to attorneys’ ability to procure insurance, and 
because attorneys’ skill and knowledge puts them in a better position to assess 
risk.” Id. at n.115.  
 233. See supra notes 119–126 (outlining the joint-client theory). 
 234. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 59 (discussing the advantages of finding an 
attorney owes a duty to beneficiaries under “pass through” privity). The pass 
through privity theory provides that an attorney hired by a personal 
representative “owes a duty to the beneficiary vis-à-vis the attorney’s duty to 
the personal representative and the personal representative’s duty to the 
beneficiary.” Id. This is the approach taken in Elam v. Hyatt Legal Services as 
another case where the court found an estate representative’s attorney to owe a 
duty to estate beneficiaries. See supra note 100 (citing Elam v. Hyatt Legal 
Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 1989)). Essentially, under the pass through 
privity theory, the duty created by the attorney–client relationship between an 
attorney and the fiduciary-client is deemed to extend in full to the beneficiaries 
of the estate. Fuller, supra note 5, at 61. The estate representative’s relationship 
to the beneficiaries “provides the requisite element of privity to establish a duty” 
owed by the attorney to beneficiaries. Fuller, supra note 5, at 61–62. Whether a 
court says that an attorney is in direct privity with beneficiaries or applies the 
pass through privity theory, the effect is that an attorney is liable to 
beneficiaries for damages arising from the attorney’s negligent conduct. Fuller, 
supra note 5, at 59. 
 235. Fuller, supra note 5, at 60–61. This idea is also explained by 
acknowledging the joint interests of the trustee or estate representative and the 
beneficiaries. Lee, supra note 4, at 479. Some argue that because the 
beneficiary’s interests “seem to flow to and become the interests of the 
fiduciary,” counsel for the fiduciary-client “must recognize this relationship and 
also adopt the beneficiary as a joint-client.” Id. 
 236. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 62 (“Thus, all of the individuals to whom 
the attorney might potentially be liable are immediately identifiable as 
individuals to whom the personal representative owes a duty, thereby providing 
the attorney with a degree of certainty in performing her duties.”). 
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potential adversity between beneficiaries and estate 
representatives.237 Indeed, when the fiduciary and the 
beneficiaries are joint-clients of an attorney, all parties are 
included in the “circle of confidences” surrounding the attorney–
client relationship.238 If the lawyer discovered that the trustee or 
estate representative was in breach of fiduciary duties, the 
lawyer would have an ethical obligation to inform the 
beneficiaries of the breach due to the duty of loyalty owed to 
beneficiaries.239 
B. Disadvantages of Imposing Duties 
One of the most significant disadvantages of imposing duties 
on an attorney is the possibility of creating conflicting 
interests.240 Many courts fear that imposing a duty of care to 
promote the beneficiaries’ interests—whether as joint-clients or 
otherwise—will conflict with an attorney’s interests in 
representing the fiduciary-client.241 Such conflicts of interest are 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id. (explaining that the attorney is able to provide advice to both 
estate representatives and beneficiaries, which “alleviates, rather than 
exacerbates, potential adversity between the personal representative and the 
beneficiaries”). 
 238. Tuttle, supra note 2, at 911. 
 239. See id. (noting that “the lawyer would have no ethical barrier to 
disclosing the breach to the beneficiary” because all material information 
disclosed to the attorney by the fiduciary would have to be disclosed to the 
beneficiaries). 
 240. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 27 (2012) (explaining 
that “conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate 
administration”); Fuller, supra note 5, at 54 (“[T]he primary concern of courts 
that adopt this approach seems to center around the potential adversarial 
relationship between the personal representative and the beneficiaries.”); Lee, 
supra note 4, at 470 (“One of the most difficult issues an attorney may face in 
the representation of a fiduciary relates to conflict of interest.”). But see Pennell, 
supra note 11, at 1319 (noting that an inquiry into whom the attorney owes 
fiduciary duties “is of academic interest only, because the potential for a real 
conflict among the fiduciary, beneficiaries, and claimants such as creditors or 
disappointed heirs never ripens into a real controversy”). 
 241. See, e.g., Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 544–45 (Mass. 1994) 
(acknowledging that when an attorney represents a fiduciary, the attorney 
should not owe duties to a beneficiary because “conflicting loyalties could 
impermissibly interfere with the attorney’s task of advising the trustee”); Trask 
v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Wash. 1994) (refusing to hold that an attorney 
for an estate representative owes duties to the beneficiaries because “the 
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often impermissible, as they impinge on an attorney’s ability to 
adequately represent the fiduciary-client.242 Indeed, an actual 
conflict of interest does not have to arise: under the Model Rules, 
a concurrent conflict of interest exists if a relationship creates a 
“significant risk” of conflicting responsibilities.243 Thus, the 
attorney “would be prohibited from continuing this type of 
relationship unless each party gives informed consent to the 
representation despite the conflicting interests.”244 The fiduciary 
effectively would be unable to obtain legal counsel if even one 
beneficiary refused to consent to the conflict.245 The likelihood of 
this problem increases with each additional beneficiary involved 
in the fiduciary relationship.246 This problem is evidence that 
imposing duties on a fiduciary’s attorney could prevent an 
attorney from fulfilling his ethical obligations to the fiduciary-
client.247  
                                                                                                     
unresolvable conflict of interest an estate attorney encounters in deciding 
whether to represent the personal representative, the estate, or the estate heirs 
unduly burdens the legal profession” (emphasis added)); Lee, supra note 4, at 
481 (“[C]ourts have explained that this type of representation is not proper, as it 
would hinder the ability of the attorney to act in the best of both clients.”). 
 242. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 54 (recognizing courts’ fear that finding an 
attorney owes a duty to both personal representative and beneficiaries creates 
an “untenable conflict of interest for attorneys and hampers their ability to 
represent their clients”). 
 243. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2012). 
 244. Lee, supra note 4, at 481; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(b)(4) (allowing representation to continue despite a conflict of interest if, 
among other things, “each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing”). 
 245. Lee, supra note 4, at 481 (explaining how a conflict of interest would 
affect an attorney’s representation of a fiduciary and multiple beneficiaries). 
 246. See id. (describing the enhancement of the problem with more 
beneficiaries); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 912 (acknowledging the unity of fiduciary 
and beneficiary interests “may hold true where there is only one beneficiary but 
seems less likely in those fiduciary relationships which involve multiple 
beneficiaries, who may have conflicting interests”).  
An example of such conflicting interests would be those of income 
beneficiaries and remaindermen beneficiaries, who have “structurally different 
economic interests.” Tuttle, supra note 2, at 912. Income beneficiaries prefer 
investments that will create more income today while remaindermen prefer 
investments with long-term appreciation potential without depletion by income 
beneficiaries. Id.  
 247. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 54 (“Presumably, the fear is that attorneys’ 
ethical obligations to clients are undermined if they are held to owe a duty to 
non-client beneficiaries.”). 
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Finally, imposing a duty on attorneys to beneficiaries 
undermines the goals of legal malpractice for professional 
negligence.248 Recall that the duty of care is a duty to “exercise 
the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in 
similar circumstances.”249 This is the standard that some courts 
are applying to attorneys in relation to beneficiaries, discussed 
above,250 whether called a fiduciary duty or a duty of care.251 
Recall also that the goals of legal malpractice for professional 
negligence are to discourage a lawyer’s improper conduct or 
inaction and to compensate plaintiffs for injury caused by such 
negligence.252 However, allowing third-party beneficiaries to 
bring professional negligence claims significantly increases an 
attorney’s possible liability, which may have detrimental effects 
on the fiduciary relationship.253 The goals of attorney liability for 
professional negligence are undermined by attorneys increasing 
the price of legal representation to cover the risks of liability or 
by creating pressure on attorneys to “slight the proper concerns of 
clients in order to avoid liability to nonclients.”254 As the lawyer’s 
                                                                                                     
 248. See infra notes 252–258 and accompanying text (explaining ways in 
which imposing duties on attorneys frustrates the objectives of professional 
negligence). 
 249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (2000).  
 250. See supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (detailing court opinions 
applying the duty of care standard to attorneys in relation to beneficiaries). 
 251. See supra Part II.A.3 (analyzing the common conflation of the duty of 
care and fiduciary duties). 
 252. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 cmt. b 
(discussing how professional negligence and malpractice are applied to 
attorneys). 
 253. See Alan F. Streisand, Malpractice Melee: Fending Off the Disgruntled 
and Disappointed, an Estate Planner’s Field Guide, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY 
PROP. L.J. 241, 262 (2011) (“Relaxing privity to permit third parties to 
commence professional negligence actions against estate planning attorneys 
would produce undesirable results—uncertainty and limitless liability.” (quoting 
Estate of Schneider v. Finman, 15 N.Y.3d 306, 310 (2010))); Tuttle, supra note 2, 
at 892 (emphasizing that imposing duties on attorneys owed to beneficiaries 
“exposes lawyers to significantly increased malpractice liability with potentially 
damaging consequences for the fiduciary relationship itself”). 
 254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 cmt. b; see 
also Fuller, supra note 5, at 42 (“[A] duty owed by an attorney to the general 
public imposes potentially huge liability on attorneys in general.”); Tuttle, supra 
note 2, at 943 (explaining that “a legal duty to protect the beneficiary creates 
significant potential liability for the attorney”). 
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malpractice exposure and time required for fiduciary oversight 
increase, the lawyer’s costs increase.255 Often, these costs prevent 
fiduciaries from obtaining counsel or are spread to the 
beneficiaries.256 Conflicting concerns exist, however, because it 
can be difficult to distinguish harm caused by inappropriate 
lawyer conduct from harm to nonclients resulting from a lawyer 
vigorously representing a client.257 Therefore, holding an attorney 
liable to nonclients could discourage attorneys from such vigorous 
representation of clients.258 
C. Advantages of Applying the Traditional Approach 
Most notably, the traditional approach avoids the conflicts of 
interest problem discussed above.259 By holding that a fiduciary’s 
attorney owes no duties to the beneficiaries (other than those 
duties owed to all nonclients), an attorney’s only concern is for 
the interests of the fiduciary-client.260 Thus, if the interests of the 
fiduciary-client and a beneficiary become adverse, it is clear that 
the attorney’s loyalties lie only with the fiduciary-client and that 
no concurrent conflict of interest exists.261 
The traditional approach also encourages the fiduciary-client 
to “communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Tuttle, supra note 2, at 943 (noting the potential for an attorney to 
increase the cost of representing a fiduciary if the attorney is determined to owe 
some form of duty to beneficiaries as well). 
 256. See id. (recognizing that the lawyer’s costs “and thus, ultimately, the 
beneficiary’s costs” will increase as a result of the added attorney duty to 
beneficiaries). 
 257. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000) 
cmt. b (addressing the duty of care as applied to nonclients). 
 258. See id. (acknowledging a concern with holding attorneys liable to 
nonclients). 
 259. See Lee, supra note 4, at 474 (“One of the benefits of the traditional 
theory is that attorneys are provided sufficient guidance when faced with a 
conflict of interest question.”); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 905 (noting that the 
approach applying no duties to beneficiaries on a fiduciary’s attorney “avoids the 
conflicts of interest that are endemic to any theory of joint or entity 
representation”). 
 260. See Tuttle, supra note 2, at 905 (explaining that the conflicts of interest 
issue is avoided by “restricting the lawyer’s loyalties to the fiduciary–client”). 
 261. See Lee, supra note 4, at 474 (“If the attorney owes no duties to the 
beneficiary, there can be no concurrent conflict of interest.”). 
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embarrassing and legally damaging subject matter.”262 It 
achieves this by stressing the “inviolable nature of the fiduciary’s 
confidences.”263 The fiduciary-client is encouraged to 
communicate openly with the attorney, which allows the attorney 
to give the best representation and advice.264 Open 
communication between the fiduciary and the attorney permits 
the fiduciary to fulfill his fiduciary duties more properly and to 
administer the trust or estate without suffering from being poorly 
informed.265 A properly advised trustee is better for beneficiaries 
because the trustee is more capable of looking after the 
beneficiaries’ interests.266 
D. Disadvantages of Applying the Traditional Approach 
Most opponents of the traditional theory are concerned that 
it does not provide adequate protection to beneficiaries.267 For 
example, “[o]pponents of the traditional theory claim that justice 
would not be served if the attorney were permitted to simply 
withdraw from representation or withhold information while the 
beneficiary’s interests are injured.”268 Arguably, requiring an 
attorney to disclose to beneficiaries any breach of the fiduciary-
                                                                                                     
 262. See id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2012)). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 642 (2011) (“Without the ability to render 
independent and candid legal advice, attorneys and, importantly, their clients 
have nothing.”); Lee, supra note 4, at 491 (“By clarifying where the attorney’s 
loyalties rest, the fiduciary is able to openly communicate with the attorney in 
order to receive the best advice and representation.”); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 
938 (“When a client feels free to disclose all information to his attorney, without 
fear that the attorney will disclose the information to others, the attorney is 
better able to both represent the client (promoting justice) and to dissuade the 
client from undertaking wrongful acts (promoting social utility).”). 
 265. See Lee, supra note 4, at 491 (noting the benefits of open 
communication between attorney and fiduciary when the attorney does not owe 
a duty to the beneficiaries). 
 266. See id. (explaining that “the fiduciary will not suffer from being ill-
informed and will be more capable of fulfilling his fiduciary duties and properly 
administering the trust or estate, which will benefit the beneficiary”). 
 267. See id. at 489 (“Opponents of the traditional theory demand that more 
protection be provided for a beneficiary.”). 
 268. Id. at 491. 
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client’s duties is the only way to adequately protect the 
beneficiaries’ interests.269 Opponents also fear that beneficiaries 
will have no redress when an attorney has acted negligently but 
the fiduciary has not breached any duty.270 
The second argument against the traditional theory focuses 
on the nature of the fiduciary relationship between trustee or 
estate representative and beneficiary. Opponents argue that “the 
fiduciary’s agency is inseparable from his fidelity to the 
beneficiary.”271 Because the fiduciary’s identity is “fundamentally 
relational,”272 the attorney’s relationship to the fiduciary should 
reflect the fiduciary’s loyalty to the beneficiaries.273 Opponents 
argue that the fiduciary’s attorney should not treat beneficiaries 
as “[strangers], a potential foe.”274 The traditional approach 
disregards the nature of the fiduciary’s function and relationship 
with the beneficiaries by allowing an attorney to represent a 
fiduciary while disregarding the beneficiaries’ interests.275 Thus, 
the structure of the fiduciary relationship itself calls for a “more 
nuanced understanding of the lawyer’s duties toward the client’s 
beneficiary,” such as one in which an attorney owes some duty to 
the client’s beneficiaries.276 
VI. Recommendation 
Whether classified as a fiduciary duty or a duty of care, 
theories imposing duties on a fiduciary’s attorney create more 
                                                                                                     
 269. See id. (arguing that in order to protect the interests of beneficiaries, 
the attorney should disclose fiduciary breaches). 
 270. See id. at 489 (noting the fear of protection for beneficiaries).  
 271. Tuttle, supra note 2, at 906. 
 272. Id. at 920. 
 273. See id. at 906 (“How can that duty of loyalty not affect the core of the 
lawyer’s relationship with the fiduciary?”). 
 274. Id. at 906. 
 275. See Lee, supra note 4, at 479 (explaining that the fiduciary’s interests 
and the beneficiaries’ interests are aligned; therefore, the attorney must 
recognize this relationship and adopt the beneficiary as a joint-client); Tuttle, 
supra note 2, at 892 (noting that the traditional approach “ignores the peculiar 
nature of the fiduciary’s role and relationship with the beneficiaries”). 
 276. Tuttle, supra note 2, at 906. 
BLURRED LINES 2653 
problems than benefits.277 In contrast, the traditional approach is 
clear and, by definition, avoids the problems created by holding 
that attorneys owe a duty to beneficiaries, such as conflicts of 
interest278 and increased attorney costs for greater professional 
negligence liability.279 It avoids the concerns about fiduciaries’ 
incapability to obtain counsel280 while protecting beneficiaries by 
encouraging open communication between attorney and 
fiduciary.281 Therefore, states should adopt the traditional 
approach, which provides as follows: 
1. The fiduciary is the attorney’s only client; 
2. The attorney owes fiduciary duties only to the 
fiduciary-client; and 
3. The attorney owes no other special duties to 
beneficiaries outside of the duties owed to all third 
parties.282 
In adopting the traditional approach, states should recognize that 
the intended third-party beneficiary doctrine still applies so long 
as the specific intent to benefit third-party beneficiaries is clearly 
evident.283  
                                                                                                     
 277. See Lee, supra note 4, at 480 (noting that the problems posed by the 
joint-client theory outweigh its benefits); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 943 (“Adding 
an additional right to sue the fiduciary’s attorney imposes additional costs on 
the trust administration, raises serious conflict of interest problems for the 
attorney, and also requires the attorney to act against a central tenet of the 
lawyer’s duty to her client—the duty of confidentiality.”). 
 278. See supra notes 240–247 and accompanying text (explaining the 
concern that imposing duties on a fiduciary’s attorney may require an attorney 
to represent the potentially conflicting interests of beneficiaries and the 
fiduciary). 
 279. See supra notes 254–256 and accompanying text (discussing the fear 
that attorneys will charge more for representation to cover the increased risk of 
professional malpractice liability). 
 280. See supra notes 245, 256 (fearing fiduciaries will be unable to obtain 
counsel due to either conflicts of interest or the increased price for an attorney 
resulting from an attorney owing duties to the beneficiaries). 
 281. See supra notes 262–266 (explaining that open communication between 
attorneys and fiduciaries promotes proper administration of the estate or trust, 
which benefits the beneficiaries). 
 282. See Lee, supra note 4, at 491 (summarizing the tenets of the traditional 
approach).  
 283. See supra note 176 (addressing the intended third-party beneficiary 
theory); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1982) (“[T]o establish a 
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Contrary to opposing arguments,284 the traditional approach 
provides adequate protection to beneficiaries because they have 
methods of redress upon occurrence of misconduct by the 
fiduciary or attorney.285 If malpractice by the fiduciary’s attorney 
harms the estate or trust, the trustee or estate representative 
may bring a malpractice action against the attorney.286 Indeed, it 
is the fiduciary’s duty to bring such a malpractice action.287 If 
misconduct of the fiduciary causes a loss to the estate, the 
beneficiaries have an actionable claim against the fiduciary for 
breach of fiduciary duty.288  
                                                                                                     
duty owed by the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege 
and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was 
the primary or direct purpose of the transaction or relationship.”); Neal v. 
Baker, 194 Ill. App. 3d 485, 487–88 (1990) (applying the Pelham court’s “intent 
to directly benefit” test); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 51 (2000) (describing an attorney’s duty to nonclients whom the attorney has 
invited “to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of legal services, and the 
nonclient so relies”). 
However, it is unlikely that a beneficiary will succeed in a malpractice 
action against an attorney under this approach. Lee, supra note 4, at 473. This 
is because, although a beneficiary is almost always specifically benefitted from 
the fiduciary’s attorney–client relationship, it is extremely difficult to conclude 
that the parties to the attorney’s contract entered into it “for the principal 
purpose of providing benefit to the [beneficiaries].” Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. 
App. 1258, 1268 (1990). 
 284. Supra notes 267–270 and accompanying text.  
 285. See Correira, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that when an attorney owes a 
duty to the trustee–client alone, the beneficiaries are not left without recourse); 
Lee, supra note 4, at 491 (“The traditional theory permits a beneficiary to seek a 
remedy for misconduct by bringing a claim against the fiduciary.”).  
 286. See Allen v. Stoker, 61 P.3d 622, 624 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (noting that 
beneficiaries still have protection through the fiduciary’s ability to bring 
malpractice claims against the fiduciary’s attorney); Lee, supra note 4, at 491 
(explaining that the fiduciary may bring claims against the attorney for 
malpractice that harms the estate).  
 287. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the fiduciary’s 
duty to enforce claims on behalf of the trust). 
 288. See Allen, 61 P.3d at 624 (emphasizing the ability of beneficiaries to 
bring claims against the fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty); Trask v. Butler, 
872 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Wash. 1994) (“[A] duty is not owed from an attorney hired 
by the personal representative of an estate to the estate or to the estate 
beneficiaries . . . [because] the estate heirs may bring a direct cause of action 
against the personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty.”); Correira, 
supra note 6, at 12 (explaining that beneficiaries “can pursue an action directly 
against the trustees if they can show a breach of their fiduciary duties” (quoting 
Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 547 (1994))); Lee, supra note 4, at 491 
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Many also argue that, due to beneficiaries’ vulnerable 
position, an attorney should have the discretion to disclose 
breaches of the fiduciary-client’s duties to beneficiaries.289 
Allowing discretionary disclosure, however, threatens complete 
and honest communication between attorney and fiduciary.290 
Thus, although an attorney’s discretionary disclosure is touted as 
a protection for beneficiaries, it actually imposes a detriment.291 
In addition, the traditional approach continues to prevent 
attorneys from aiding in or counseling the fiduciary-client to 
commit a breach of fiduciary duty in most circumstances.292 If an 
attorney knowingly aids the fiduciary in a breach of fiduciary 
duty, then the attorney is liable to the beneficiaries.293 If, 
                                                                                                     
(emphasizing beneficiaries’ ability to sue the fiduciary (quoting Allen)); Tuttle, 
supra note 2, at 943 (“Finally, beneficiaries already have a right of redress for 
fiduciary misconduct: they can assert claims against the fiduciary.”).  
 289. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 64 (advocating for a pass through privity 
approach to apply duties to a fiduciary’s attorney owed to beneficiaries, which 
would require disclosure of “all information pertaining to the estate 
administration”); Lee, supra note 4, at 489 (“Advocates of modification claim 
that there are circumstances in which an attorney should be permitted to inform 
the beneficiary of a fiduciary’s misconduct.”); id. (arguing that states should 
“amend their rules to permit [disclosures]” of “fraudulent activity or another 
activity that may result in a substantial loss to the beneficiary”); Tuttle, supra 
note 2, at 954 (“Model Rule 1.6 should be changed to permit the lawyer 
discretion to disclose a fiduciary’s breach of duty.”). 
 290. See supra notes 262–266 (detailing the benefits of open and honest 
attorney–client disclosure). 
 291. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (explaining that 
beneficiaries’ interests receive greater protection when the fiduciary is 
encouraged to communicate fully and honestly with the attorney). 
 292. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012) (clarifying that an 
attorney may be liable for counseling a client to breach or assisting in a client’s 
breaching of a fiduciary duty if the breach is fraudulent or criminal); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. h (2000) 
(explaining that “[a] lawyer who assists a client to violate the client’s fiduciary 
duties is civilly liable”).  
 293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 108 cmt. b (2012) (noting that a 
third party is not liable to the trust for claims brought by beneficiaries if he 
unknowingly aided the trustee in breach of fiduciary duty); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 874, 876 (1979) (explaining that a fiduciary is subject to 
liability “for harm resulting from a breach of duty” and a third party is also 
liable for such breach if the third party knows the fiduciary is breaching a duty 
and “gives substantial assistance or encouragement”); Tuttle, supra note 2, at 
901 (“Although the third party owes no fiduciary duties to the beneficiary, she 
may be liable to the beneficiary if she knowingly participates in the fiduciary’s 
breach or gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the fiduciary in 
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however, an attorney assists in a breach of fiduciary duty 
unknowingly, then the attorney is not liable for such breach.294 
These principles reflect the prevailing legal standards of torts 
and trusts, which are undisturbed by an application of the 
traditional approach.295  
Under the traditional approach, the fiduciary’s attorney also 
must not make affirmative representations that he is 
representing or protecting the beneficiaries’ interests.296 
Therefore, an attorney may still be liable to beneficiaries if the 
attorney has made representations that he is protecting the 
beneficiaries’ interests and, in reliance on those representations, 
the beneficiaries are injured by the attorney’s negligence.297 
VII. Conclusion 
The costs of imposing a duty on a fiduciary’s attorney owed to 
beneficiaries may have some benefits that are not integrated into 
the traditional approach, but those benefits do not outweigh the 
costs.298 The traditional approach provides significant advantages 
while simultaneously protecting beneficiaries’ interests and 
providing adequate remedies for any breach of duties owed to 
them.299 The lack of uniformity across states concerning this issue 
creates the possibility for substantial liability that attorneys are 
                                                                                                     
breaching his duty.”). 
 294. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 108 (“A third party is protected 
from liability in dealing with or assisting a trustee who is committing a breach 
of trust if the third party does so without knowledge or reason to know that the 
trustee is acting improperly.”). 
 295. See supra notes 292–294 (describing how tort law and trusts law work 
together to impose liability for breach of fiduciary duty on a third party, 
including an attorney, who knowingly assists in such breach). 
 296. See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text (explaining that 
making “affirmative representations of care” may violate the attorney’s duty to 
avoid making misleading or false statements to any nonclient). 
 297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. e 
(“Accordingly, the nonclient has a claim against the lawyer if the lawyer's 
negligence with respect to the opinion or other legal services causes injury to the 
nonclient.”). 
 298. See supra notes 228–258 and accompanying text (outlining the costs 
and benefits of imposing duties on a fiduciary’s attorney owed to beneficiaries). 
 299. See supra Part V.C (noting the benefits of the traditional approach and 
its protections afforded to beneficiaries). 
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often unaware exists. The traditional approach offers the benefit 
of clarity of an attorney’s obligations. That clarity serves not only 
the attorney but also the fiduciary-client and the beneficiaries of 
the trust or estate, allowing a wider availability of legal services 
in this setting at lower costs. To ensure clarity in state trusts and 
estates law and adequate protection to all parties involved, state 
legislators should begin drafting legislation implementing the 
traditional approach before more attorneys enter the race of 
fiduciary representation with unsettled law blurring the lines.  
